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INTRODUCTION 
The practice of promoting rule of law programs in foreign 
countries has developed as a foreign policy subgenre.1 These programs 
generally pass for seemingly neutral, if not positive, endeavors, 
“packaged” in the form of disinterested intent, as a matter of selfless 
purport. Rule of law programs implicate members of the legal academy 
and profession to cooperate with U.S. government agencies in an effort 
to make global judicial systems conform to the precepts of American 
legal values. That is, these programs propound the U.S. legal system as a 
model for the world, or at least that part of the world deemed to be of 
U.S. national interest. 
This Article challenges the practice and practicability of these 
programs. It argues that U.S. law reform projects, as conditions of 
foreign aid, often serve to preempt the political discourse from 
substantive debates about justice systems, frequently oversimplify the 
problems that laws are intended to mediate, and, almost always, are 
selective about the beneficiaries of legal reform. It argues that rule of law 
programs are intended to influence the character of global governance 
complementary to counter-insurgency operations, and designed to 
promote U.S. interests often obtainable only by the very violation of the 
notion of justice.2 
 
  1 The phrase “rule of law programs” refers to efforts by U.S. entities, most often the U.S. 
Department of State, USAID, and its contractors, to bring about institutional reforms in the 
judiciaries and ministries of justice in foreign countries. See, e.g., Rule of Law Stabilization Program – 
Formal Justice Sector Component, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-
sheets/rule-law-stabilization-program-%E2%80%93-formal-justice-sector-component (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2013); USAID Rule of Law Program, Jordan 2008–2013, TETRA TECH DPK, 
http://www.tetratechdpk.com/component/content/article/64-jordan/121-usaid-rule-of-law-
program-.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); see also Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 13 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy & 
Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 34, 2003), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf. 
 2 See Andrew Bacevich, Social Work with Guns, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 7, 7 (2009) 
(describing the strategies of the war in Afghanistan); John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law 
and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, 
25, 31 (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff eds., 2006) (describing law as fetishism in response 
to growing anxiety about increasing lawlessness in developing countries); see also Michelle D. 
Bonner, Critical Debates, Law and Injustice in Latin America, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 169 
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These arguments are developed through an examination of the 
current Mérida Initiative (also known as Plan México), a product of U.S. 
policy efforts to shape the legal systems of select foreign countries. This 
Article seeks to provide an alternative perspective to the way rule of law 
programs have been depicted by the dominant rule of law policy 
discourse. It also argues these programs cannot be assessed by 
measuring the benefits of the accusatorial system against those of the 
inquisitorial system, or whether oral trials are superior to written trials, 
or even by considering whether the promotion of the presumption of 
innocence is sufficient to validate such projects. Moreover, the manner 
by which the United States has attempted to dominate legal reform 
efforts has produced distrust and compromised the Mexican sense of 
national sovereignty.3 
This is not to argue that rule of law programs lack the potential to 
improve justice outcomes, of course. Under optimum circumstances, 
rule of law programs can serve to inspire citizens to claim their legal 
rights and protections, articulate their demands, and advance their goals 
for an improved justice system.4 But, it is also true that such efforts must 
originate within the polity for whom judicial processes are designed to 
serve. In order for legal rights to inspire confidence and obtain 
credibility, citizens must determine the means and develop the 
substance of systems of law in a manner consistent with their history 
and political institutions. 
This Article proceeds by examining the circumstances in Mexico as 
they relate to U.S. efforts to export law and legal systems. Part I 
describes the phenomenon of escalating drug-related violence in 
Mexico, including the “hyperstitious”5 narrative that characterizes the 
media coverage of crime and victimization in Mexico. It reviews the 
inability of the Mexican legal system to respond adequately to crime, a 
concern that has been documented by Mexican and U.S. scholars and 
jurists and, perhaps most notably, by social movements that have long 
demanded accountability for crime and violence in Mexico.6 Part I 
concludes by chronicling the U.S. response to drug-related violence in 
Mexico, and specifically its foreign aid plan known as the Mérida 
 
(2008) (noting a focus on the rule of law as a means of addressing persistent violence in Latin 
America). 
 3 See infra Part IV. 
 4 See Deborah M. Weissman, Gender and Human Rights: Between Morals and Politics, in 
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 409, 409–10 (Linda C. 
McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009). 
 5 See Richard Seymour, The Uses of al-Qaida, in 34 LONDON REV. BOOKS 25, 25 (2012) 
(using the term to describe a discursive quality of hype and over-reaching to justify U.S. 
intervention throughout the Middle East). 
 6 See generally MAKING A KILLING: FEMICIDE, FREE TRADE, AND LA FRONTERA (Alicia 
Gaspar de Alba & Georgina Guzmán eds., 2010); TERRORIZING WOMEN: FEMINICIDE IN THE 
AMERICAS (Rosa-Linda Fregoso & Cynthia Bejarano eds., 2010). 
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Initiative which, in addition to financing the militarization of the war on 
drugs, serves to fund and direct the overhaul of Mexico’s legal system. 
The Article next formulates a critical theoretical and pragmatic 
framework within which to examine U.S. rule of law programs as a 
foreign policy template. Part II considers the use of law as a political 
instrument in a historical context with a focus on long-standing U.S. 
efforts to reform legal systems, and specifically, the persistence of flawed 
practices that appear to have little effect on current initiatives. It reviews 
the flawed efforts to transplant programs in Latin America that have 
nonetheless failed to inform current initiatives.  
Part III builds upon long-standing questions concerning the 
efficacy of exporting legal systems.7 It then considers foundational 
differences between U.S. and Mexican legal systems and argues that the 
Mérida Initiative rule of law program is ill-matched with Mexico’s legal 
culture, if not in conflict with many of Mexico’s current reform efforts.8 
Part IV examines the relationship between rule of law programs 
and national sovereignty. Efforts to transplant legal systems that 
impinge on the prerogative of the nation have been viewed with 
suspicion and may well undermine Mexican law reform efforts and 
produce baneful outcomes. Part V appraises the Mérida rule of law 
program as a technocratic undertaking that acts to reduce the 
formulation of justice to bureaucratic procedures and lawyers as 
technicians. What appears to the casual observer to be an ideology-free 
commitment is, in fact, driven by a normative system that in a Mexican 
context may well serve to stifle public debate about the merits and 
motivation of rule of law programs. Obscured too are the social 
consequences of misguided efforts to remake the Mexican judicial 
system serve in function of U.S national interests. 
I.     DRUG VIOLENCE, IMPUNITY, AND THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE’S RULE OF 
LAW PROGRAM: CREATING A “CULTURE OF LAWFULNESS” IN MEXICO9 
Violence in Mexico has become an issue of global concern. 
Newspapers offer daily descriptions of horrific crimes that have been 
committed: decapitations, charred bodies, and corpses in barrels of lye.10 
 
 7 The word “transplant” is used to reflect the imposition of legal changes and is 
distinguished from the term “legal translation.” Holning Lau, The Language of Westernization 
in Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 523 (2013); see Jorge L. Esquirol, The Turn to 
Legal Interpretation in Latin America, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2011) (describing a 
transnational legal discourse in Latin America). 
 8 See infra Part III. 
 9 EMBASSY OF THE U.S. IN MEX., FACT SHEET: CULTURE OF LAWFULNESS (2013), available 
at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/nov-2013/COL-factsheet-Nov-2013-eng.pdf. 
 10 Marc Lacey, With Deadly Persistence, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2009, at A1; Richard Marosi, Mexico Under Siege: A City Goes Silent at His Name, L.A. 
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These gruesome acts have been attributed to a war between different 
drug cartels, the government’s response to drug cartel violence, and a 
consequence of government corruption and impunity. Drug trafficking, 
which generates billions of dollars annually, comprises an increasingly 
significant part of the Mexican economy upon which many farmers 
depend for their livelihood and is a source of employment in 
transportation, banking, and security.11 
An analysis of the drug war dynamics raises a number of concerns, 
both historical and current, from the local to the transnational, some 
overlapping and others seemingly unrelated. Drug trafficking is a 
function of agricultural shifts, geography, proximity to the United 
States, and the increasing ease with which transnational crime is 
facilitated in an era of globalization.12 Without an understanding of the 
political economic determinants of Mexico’s drug-related violence, it is 
unlikely that prevailing commentary can provide meaningful 
information or that law-related reform initiatives can improve the 
circumstances. 
A.     Drug Violence in Context 
It would be impractical to attempt to review the multiple and 
multivariable determinants that give rise to Mexico’s violence. The 
following discussion offers a summary of the dynamics most frequently 
identified as contributors to Mexico’s drug cartel violence. 
1.     NAFTA and Free Trade: Easy Recruits for Drug Cartels 
Much has been written on the adverse effect of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)13 upon Mexico’s domestic economy.14 
 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at 1; James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexican Investigator of American’s Killing Is 
Beheaded, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A29. 
 11 See Charles Bowden on Mexico’s Dirty War Against Drugs, DEMOCRACY NOW (Aug. 11, 
2009), http://www.democracynow.org/2009/8/11/charles_bowden_on_mexicos_dirty_war 
(estimating that Mexico earns $30 billion to $50 billion a year from selling drugs); Ami C. 
Carpenter, Beyond Drug Wars: Transforming Factional Conflict in Mexico, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. 
Q. 401, 407 (2010) (stating that the drug trade brings in $23 billion in revenue annually or 
twenty percent of Mexico’s GDP). 
 12 See Betty Horwitz, The Role of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD): Confronting the Problem of Illegal Drugs in the Americas, 52 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 
139, 140 (2010). 
 13 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&
language=en-US. 
 14 KEVIN P. GALLAGHER ET AL., BOSTON UNIV., THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE 
POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 3 (2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/
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The enactment of NAFTA slowed the Mexican economy, caused wages 
to remain low and real wages to decline, and has harmed the 
environment—all measures that demonstrate, with regard to basic 
human needs, Mexicans may well be worse off now than before the 
treaty.15 Mexico has had the slowest growth rate of any Latin American 
country.16 Subsidized and tax-free products flooding Mexican markets 
from the United States have caused the “hollow[ing] out” of Mexico’s 
domestic economy.17 Funding for infrastructure, services, and schools 
diminished.18 Staple items in the Mexican diet have quadrupled in 
price.19  
NAFTA also contributed to rising inequality and extreme poverty, 
and drug cartels exploit these circumstances.20 As one study has noted, 
“[f]or the cartels, this huge pool of the poor serves as a recruiting 
ground for foot soldiers in a war that’s growing more deadly every 
month.”21 Further: 
[w]hile the narcotraficantes use violence to silence those who oppose 
them, they also use the proceeds from the drug trade to cultivate a 
loyal following among the poor and disaffected. The Gulf Cartel 
donates food, bicycles, clothing, and toys to Nuevo Laredo residents, 
and drug kingpins throw festivals for the residents of their 
strongholds. In many cases, these overtures find a receptive 
audience.22 
 
Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf (NAFTA “decimat[ed] many existing sources of livelihood” in 
Mexico.); Jeff Faux, NAFTA at 10, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.epi.org/
publication/webfeatures_viewpoints_nafta_legacy_at10/ (describing across the board economic 
hardship in Mexico as a consequence of NAFTA). 
 15 JOHN J. AUDLEY ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, NAFTA’S PROMISE 
AND REALITY 6 (2004), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf; 
EDUARDO ZEPEDA ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, RETHINKING TRADE 
POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM MEXICO UNDER NAFTA 5 (2009), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/07/rethinking-trade-policy-for-development-lessons-
from-mexico-under-nafta/2uli. 
 16 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 1. 
 17 GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 30; ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (noting that 
the Mexican economy shrunk by about seven percent); see also Alejandro Nadal, 
Macroeconomic Challenges for Mexico’s Development Strategy, in CONFRONTING 
DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING MEXICO’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES 62 (Kevin J. 
Middlebrook & Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2003). 
 18 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 15. 
 19 See Gary Prevost & Robert Weber, The Prospects for the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
in the Bush Administration, in NEOLIBERALISM AND NEOPANAMERICANISM: THE VIEW FROM 
LATIN AMERICA 67, 71 (Gary Prevost & Carlos Oliva Campos eds., 2002). 
 20 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 15. 
 21 Jason Beaubien, As Drug War Turns into Quagmire, Fear Rules Mexico, NPR (Aug. 2, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=128804488. 
 22 HAL BRANDS, MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG POLICY 19 
(2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a499142.pdf. 
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To complicate matters further, over two million people have lost the 
ability to survive through traditional farming and agriculture; many 
have turned to drug crops in order to survive.23 The weakening of 
Mexico’s economy has diminished the capacity of the state to respond to 
its current crisis. Privatization of once state-owned businesses and the 
deregulation of the banking system have made it easier for drug cartels 
to launder their drug profits.24 As one priest working in Mexico’s 
prisons noted while referring to one of the most notorious drug cartels, 
“[i]f the economy worked for the common good, there would be no 
Zetas.”25 
While some studies show the Mexican export economy is 
rebounding, it has far to go before Mexicans experience relief.26 Mexico 
suffered the worst economic recession of all of Latin America following 
the global economic crisis of 2009.27 According to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it had one of the 
highest levels of inequality and poverty of any OECD evaluated nation.28 
These conditions suggest ongoing difficulties in the effort to eradicate 
drug violence. 
2.     Guns Go South, Drugs Go North 
Drug violence in Mexico is not entirely homegrown. U.S. policies 
with regard to gun sales and drugs are inextricably linked with cartel 
violence and contribute to the difficulty in bringing about an end to 
lawlessness and corruption. U.N. reports, investigations by the U.S. 
government agencies, and media inquiries have determined many of the 
weapons used by cartels originated in the United States, especially in 
border states such as Arizona, said to have “weakest gun violence 
prevention laws.”29 According to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
 
 23 GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 35–36; J. Patrick Larue, The “ILL-ICIT” Effects of 
NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking into the United States Through the Southwest Border, 9 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 38, 45 n.144 (2000) (noting that farmers have resorted to growing 
illicit cannabis and poppy crops). 
 24 PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 23 (2000). 
 25 Damien Cave, Salvation Army of One, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, at MM30 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 26 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS 13 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL32934.pdf. 
 27 Id. 
 28 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Mexico 2013, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/mexico2013.htm (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2014). 
 29 Katherine Eban, The Truth About Fast and Furious, CNNMONEY (June 27, 2012, 5:00 
AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/27/fast-and-furious-truth (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE 
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and Firearms and Explosives (ATF), “[b]y 2009 the Sinaloa drug cartel 
had made Phoenix its gun supermarket and recruited young Americans 
as its designated shoppers or straw purchasers.”30 Some not old enough 
to buy alcohol “were plunking down as much as $20,000 in cash to 
purchase up to 20 semiautomatics at a time, and then delivering the 
weapons to others.”31 
Since 2006, Mexican authorities have confiscated over 60,000 
weapons from drug cartels purchased from U.S. gun dealers.32 The 
Inspector General’s investigation of the ATF scandal known as 
“Operation Fast and Furious” revealed, as a result of “a dysfunctional 
and poorly supervised group of Arizona-based federal prosecutors and 
[ATF] agents,” hundreds of U.S. weapons passed into the hands of 
Mexican drug gangs.33 Operation Fast and Furious was not the first ill-
fated program designed to traffic weapons into Mexico as a sting 
operation. In 2006 and 2007, a program called “Wide Receiver” similarly 
failed to track weapons and resulted in an unknown number of guns 
falling into the hands of Mexican cartels,34 some of which emerged from 
a group of elite U.S. trained Mexican soldiers to fight insurgents in Latin 
America.35 In addition, U.S. Border Patrol and a mayor of a town in 
New Mexico have been implicated in smuggling illegal guns to Mexican 
cartels.36 
 
GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 133–
39 (2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html 
(reporting that about 20,000 firearms enter Mexico from the United States every year); Ed 
Payne, Many Weapons Used by Mexican Drug Gangs Originate in U.S., CNN (June 14, 2011, 
1:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/14/mexico.guns/index.html (describing a report 
that found that more than seventy percent of firearms submitted to the ATF from Mexico for 
tracing originated in the United States); Richard A. Serrano, Fast and Furious Gun Found After 
Cartel Shootout, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at 14 (reporting that about 2000 weapons lost under 
the U.S. gun program known as “Fast and Furious” now flow freely across the U.S.-Mexico 
border); Pete Yost, ATF Says 68,000 Guns Seized in Mexico Traced Back to U.S., WASH. POST, 
Apr. 27, 2012, at A14 (stating that at least 68,000 guns in the past five years have been traced 
back to the United States). 
 30 Eban, supra note 29. 
 31 Id. 
 32 James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, Mexican Cartels Wielding American Weapons, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A01. See generally Eban, supra note 29; Katie Soltis, Mexican Drug 
Violence Fueled by U.S. Guns, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.coha.org/mexican-drug-violence-fueled-by-u-s-guns/#more-13110. 
 33 Charlie Savage, Justice Inquiry Faults Its Own in Gun Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, 
at A1. 
 34  Serrano, supra note 29. 
 35 Enrique Krauze, Mexico at War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2012, at 66, 68 (describing 
the origins of the Zetas, known to be one of the most vicious cartels of all); Serrano, supra note 
29. 
36 Aaron Bracamontes, Ex-Border Patrol Agent Gets 4 Years in Gun Smuggling Case, EL PASO 
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/tablehome/ci_22089977/former-
border-patrol-agent-gets-4-years-gun; Mayor of N.M. Town Pleads Guilty to Gun Smuggling, USA 
TODAY (July 13, 2011, 11:47 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-13-new-
mexico-town-mayor-gun-smuggling-mexico_n.htm. 
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U.S. drug policies further contribute to drug violence in Mexico. 
Demand in the United States provides much of the stimulus for 
Mexico’s drug wars. As one noted journalist has explained: 
Drugs are an old business in Mexico. Farmers in the remote high 
sierra of the western state of Sinaloa have been growing opium 
poppies since the late 19th century—and marijuana long before 
that—but smuggling did not become a viable enterprise until the US 
created an illicit market by regulating the use of opiates in 1914. 
Then, as now, drugs flowed one way: north.37 
Mexicans also use illicit drugs, and more so in recent years.38 
However, illegal drug use in Latin America, including those countries 
that produce drugs, is notably less than in the United States.39 Mexico’s 
response to drug use is largely a function of the heavy hand of U.S. drug 
policy, particularly since the 1970s when President Richard Nixon first 
declared the “War on Drugs”—a declaration with extraterritorial 
reach.40 The U.S. government succeeded in pressuring Mexico to rely on 
its military apparatus to curtail drug trafficking notwithstanding the 
widespread knowledge that Mexico’s federal troops were guilty of 
committing heinous human rights abuses.41  
The United States persists in imposing its supply-side interdiction 
policies through a combination of aid conditions and other certification 
and assistance programs, notwithstanding the demonstrable 
ineffectiveness of such an approach.42 At the same time, U.S. authorities 
have been lax in programs designed to reduce domestic drug demand 
which experts have noted to be “a far more effective and humane 
strategy than any supply-reduction approach.”43 In sum, the U.S. 
prohibitionist approach to drugs contributes to violence in Mexico 
 
 37 Ben Ehrenreich, A Lucrative War, 32 LONDON REV. BOOKS 15 (2010); see also Pamela F. 
Izaguirre, Narco-Politics: How Mexico Got There and How It Can Get Out, COUNCIL ON 
HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.coha.org/narco-politics-how-mexico-got-there-
and-how-it-can-get-out (describing the history of the production of illicit cash crops in Mexico 
as a function of U.S. demand after World War II). 
 38 HOWARD CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF 
EL PASO AND JUÁREZ 97 (2009). 
 39 Horace A. Bartilow & Kihong Eom, Free Traders and Drug Smugglers: The Effects of 
Trade Openness on States’ Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 117, 
123–24 (2008) (citing the UN World Drug Report 2006). 
 40 Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 15. For a discussion of Mexico’s efforts to change course 
and consider legalization and public health approaches to illicit drugs, see infra Part III.B.4. 
 41 Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 15. The United States declined to cooperate in a 
hemispheric coalition-building approach to address drug trafficking in order to avoid providing 
a platform for leaders like Hugo Chavez. See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 140. 
 42 Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 89, 142 (1999). 
 43 LISA HAUGAARD ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: PLAN COLOMBIA’S LESSONS FOR U.S. 
POLICY TOWARD MEXICO AND BEYOND 2, 14 (2011), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/
default/files/downloadable/Cautionary_Tale.pdf. 
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while failing to curb the demand for the trafficking of illicit substances 
across the border. 
3.     Mexico’s Contemporary Political History 
A number of scholars have argued that the escalation in violence is 
a consequence of the waning of the power of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), the Mexican political party that ruled between 1929 
and 2000.44 During its reign, the PRI leadership entered into 
negotiations with cartels and permitted them to conduct their illegal 
activities in exchange for a share of profits and assurances from the 
cartels to limit the violence committed in the course of their 
transactions.45 Because of these arrangements, the PRI maintained a 
type of quid pro quo arrangement that accepted violence as long as it 
was largely contained among the cartels.46 As a result, law enforcement 
agencies were weakened as corruption spread into all levels of 
institutional operations.47 At the end of the PRI’s rule, no mechanisms 
existed to curb the violence and maintain “equilibrium.” 
President Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN), assumed office in 2006 after a close and hotly 
contested election.48 He immediately launched a war on the cartels upon 
taking office.49 Critics charged that Calderón’s initiative against the 
cartels was an effort to gain “a legitimacy that he did not receive in the 
voting booth” and demonstrate the ability of his government to lead.50 
The declaration of war against the cartels transformed the character of 
 
 44 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 24; GEORGE W. GRAYSON, MEXICO: NARCO-VIOLENCE AND 
A FAILED STATE? 2 (2010) (providing PRI’s English translation as the “Institutional 
Revolutionary Party”); Carpenter, supra note 11, at 407, 410; John L. Garcia, PRI Begins Its 
Ascent to Power as a Perplexed U.S. Looks for Formula to Bring Down Mexican Drug Syndicates, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.coha.org/pri-began-its-ascent-to-
power-as-u-s-looks-for-formula-to-bring-down-mexican-drug-syndicates. Most recently, 
Enrique Peña Nieto, a PRI candidate was successful in his bid for the presidency of Mexico and 
the PRI assumed political leadership of the executive as of 2013. Damien Cave, Narrow Victory 
for Mexico’s New Leader Signals Bigger Challenges Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, at A4. 
 45 Garcia, supra note 44. 
 46 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 24; GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 2. 
 47 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 404 (noting that the cartels were dependent on government 
officials and police for protection); Garcia, supra note 44.  
 48 Miguel Tinker Salas, Mexico Drug War Losing Proposition for All of Us, PROGRESSIVE 
MEDIA PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2010), http://progressivemediaproject.org/mplovel040110.html. 
 49 Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 363, 365–66 (2010) (commenting on reports of voter irregularities); Dan 
Boscov-Ellen, La Pesadilla de Prohibición—Drug Policy and Violence in Mexico, COUNCIL ON 
HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 23, 2010), http://www.coha.org/la-pesadilla-de-prohibicion-
%E2%80%93-drug-policy-and-violence-in-mexico. 
 50 Luis Hernandez Navarro, A War on Drugs? No, It Is a War on the Mexican People, THE 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2010, at 26. 
WEISSMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:31 PM 
2014] RE M A KIN G  ME XIC O  1481 
 
the drug trade in Mexico. Cartels moved from engaged battle with each 
other for territory and control of a lucrative and illicit transnational 
enterprise to a war to destabilize a government that had changed the 
rules of the relationship.51 
With the election of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012, the PRI has once 
again assumed political leadership, although by a smaller margin than 
previous elections.52 While disavowing the PRI’s historic pacts with the 
cartels, Peña Nieto has committed to continuing Calderón’s military 
approach against drug cartels—an approach which is likely to continue 
to produce violence.53 
B.     The Mexican Legal System’s Failure to Respond 
During the last two decades, the Mexican judicial system has come 
under domestic and international scrutiny and criticism for its inability 
to adequately respond to crime and violence.54 The absence of legal 
rights and accountability has been identified as a fundamental cause of 
the murders and has resulted in a climate of impunity.55 Crime victims 
have little trust in law enforcement agencies and are reluctant to report 
crime.56 Human rights groups have criticized Mexico’s failure to provide 
justice to victims of violent crimes and human rights violations.57 
Defendants, too, suffer the denial of any semblance of due process; they 
are snatched off the streets by police without warrants and are 
subsequently subjected to a variety of abuses.58 Mexican courts have 
been described as weak, and malfeasance has plagued judicial 
 
 51 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 411 (noting the use of “shock and awe” tactics used to 
undermine confidence in the government). 
 52 Cave, supra note 44. 
 53 Id. But see Randal C. Archibold et al., New Friction as Mexico Curbs U.S. Cooperation in 
Drug Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1 (describing the message sent by Mexico’s President 
Peña Nieto about changes to the nature of the relationship between the United States and 
Mexico regarding the war on drugs). 
 54 Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an Understanding of 
the Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juárez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 795, 808 (2005) 
(reviewing the failure of the Mexican legal system to respond to the murders of women in 
Ciudad Juárez). The Mexican judiciary is deemed to be far weaker than the other branches of 
government. See MATTHEW C. INGRAM ET AL., ASSESSING MEXICO’S JUDICIAL REFORM 4 (2012), 
available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-reform
1.pdf. 
 55 AMNESTY INT’L, MEXICO: INTOLERABLE KILLINGS: 10 YEARS OF ABDUCTIONS AND 
MURDERS OF WOMEN IN CIUDAD JUÁREZ AND CHIHUAHUA: SUMMARY REPORT AND APPEALS 
CASES (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/027/2003/en/
e81827cb-d6b3-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/amr410272003en.pdf. 
 56 JO TUCKMAN, MEXICO: DEMOCRACY INTERRUPTED 108 (2012) (Over eighty percent of 
crime victims consider it a “waste of time” to report the crime to authorities.). 
 57 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mexico, in WORLD REPORT 191 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf. 
 58 TUCKMAN, supra note 56, at 109 (noting concerns about incarceration of the innocent). 
WEISSMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:31 PM 
1482 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1471 
 
processes.59 The presumption of innocence exists in theory but is given 
little practical consideration.60 Judges accept as evidence confessions 
elicited through torture and other mistreatment.61 Courts often function 
as “rubber-stamp[s]” for prosecutors who routinely abuse their 
authority.62 
The Mexican judicial system suffers from corruption and 
insufficient resources.63 Human rights activists have demonstrated 
impunity reigns; military officers often are accused of human rights 
violations.64 Penitentiaries have been described as “the true universities 
of crime.”65 Indeed, as the Mexican documentary, Presumed Guilty 
(Presunto Culpable), filmed by two Mexican lawyers, has chronicled, 
many Mexicans are more fearful of the criminal justice system than 
crime itself.66 
C.     The United States’ Response: Exporting Law 
Accounts of the threats posed by drug cartel violence, fear of the 
loss of control of the U.S.-Mexico border, and the inability of the 
Mexican judicial system to respond have developed into the dominant 
narrative of Mexico, and have resulted in a number of responses from 
the United States.67 Primary among them has been the Mérida Initiative, 
a legislative plan designed to develop a heightened military response to 
Mexico’s drug wars.68 The State Department initially identified the 
 
 59 Weissman, supra note 54, at 848. 
 60 EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & DAVID A. SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS 269 (2d 
ed. 2012); TUCKMAN, supra note 56, at 109. 
 61 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 191 (noting that when torture is revealed, the 
justice system has systematically failed to investigate or prosecute such acts); Elisabeth Malkin, 
Mexico: Torture Reports Triple, Group Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/americas/mexico-torture-reports-triple-group-
finds.html?ref=world.  
 62 Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Sociolegal Studies on Mexico, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 312 
(2012). 
 63 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 191. 
 64 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos 
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Santiago Aguirre, Att’y, 
Tlachinollan Human Rights Center), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/
2012_5_10_Human_Rights_In_Mexico/Santiago_Aguirre_Testimony.pdf (testifying that 
impunity results because the army investigates itself and military courts maintain jurisdiction 
over these claims). 
 65 Krauze, supra note 35, at 69. 
 66 PRESUMED GUILTY (Lawyers with Camera 2010). 
 67 Ginger Thompson, U.S. Bolsters Security at Mexican Border, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, 
at A10 (noting that according to a government spokesman, the relationship between the United 
States and Mexico has received “‘sustained, high-level, comprehensive attention’” related to 
fears of an explosion of crime across the border). 
 68 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1406, 122 Stat. 2323, 2339–40. 
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plan’s four primary goals: 1) break the power and impunity of criminal 
organizations; 2) assist in strengthening border, air, and maritime 
controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems; and 4) curtail gang 
activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.69 In 2009, 
after front-loading most of the funds to pay for military equipment to 
intensify the war on drugs cartels, the Obama administration issued a 
revised set of goals that attempted to de-emphasize the escalation of a 
military response and instead draw attention to U.S. plans to help 
Mexico build civil society institutions and judicial systems. Phase II, 
known as Beyond Mérida, called for developing a “culture of lawfulness” 
by focusing greater attention to the task of reforming Mexico’s legal 
system.70 In 2010, the United States reaffirmed its intention to 
institutionalize the rule of law in Mexico by strengthening Mexican law 
enforcement capabilities and judicial institutions.71 Some have 
welcomed the discursive shift from a policy that emphasized military 
escalation as the priority for Mérida funding to “building the rule of 
law” as a positive change in the approach to the problem of drug-related 
violence.72 Others have been skeptical.73 
The Mérida Initiative rule of law program has been administered 
primarily by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Department of Justice as part of a larger ongoing plan 
 
 69 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, Counternarcotics and Law 
Enforcement Country Program: Mexico, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/114078.htm. Although this Article focuses on the Mérida 
Initiative’s rule of law program, it is important to note the criticisms of the U.S. decision to 
fund the Mexican military. See, e.g., Boscov-Ellen, supra note 49. 
 70 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: THE UNITED STATES HAS 
PROVIDED COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME SUPPORT BUT NEEDS BETTER PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES 6 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf. 
 71 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., U.S.-
MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 2, 21 (2011), 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171385.pdf.  
 72 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos 
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Maureen Meyer, Senior Assoc., 
Wash. Office on Latin Am. on Human Rights in Mexico), available at http://www.wola.org/
sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2012/MMeyer%20testimony%20TLHRC.pdf (urging 
continued U.S. support for the rule of project). 
 73 Isaac Campos, In Search of Real Reform: Lessons from Mexico’s Long History of Drug 
Prohibition, NACLA REP. AM., May/June 2011, at 14 (referring to drug violence as “drug-policy 
related violence” due to the evidence that criminalization policies and enhanced law 
enforcement strategies have contributed to escalating violence); see GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG 
POL’Y, WAR ON DRUGS: REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY 5, 15 (2011), 
available at http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/
Global_Commission_Report_English.pdf (reviewing evidence indicating that criminalization 
strategies to respond to drug violence often exacerbate the problem). But see Damien Cave & 
Michael S. Schmidt, Rise in Pill Abuse Forces New Look at U.S. Drug Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2012, at A1 (noting, however, that a shift from funding for military equipment to “institution-
building” was not likely to change soon). 
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related to reforming Mexico’s legal system.74 In collaboration with the 
State Department, USAID has contracted with private firms, most 
notably Management Information Systems (MSI) and Management 
Sciences for Development, Inc. (MSD), both international development 
firms based in Washington, D.C.75 These firms have drafted, promoted, 
and managed the processes for comprehensive revisions of Mexico’s 
constitution specifically as it relates to criminal justice, seizure laws, as 
well as federal and state criminal procedure codes.76 
The Mérida plan authorizes USAID to recruit and train members 
of the federal police, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders at both 
the federal and state levels.77 The plan also directs the U.S. Department 
of Justice to administer millions of dollars of State Department and 
USAID funding to improve prosecutorial capacity, increase the internal 
control systems within the Mexican federal police and the Mexican 
 
 74 MGMT. SYS. INT’L, MEXICO RULE OF LAW STRENGTHENING: FINAL REPORT TO USAID 
JULY 6, 2004 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 4 (2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PDACO092.pdf (noting that in 2003, “USAID decided to implement its Rule of Law Project in 
Mexico”). USAID has described the work it undertook with MSI/Proderecho including the 
drafting of the revised criminal code and constitutional amendments. USAID with 
MSI/Proderecho also created a network to support constitutional reforms, helped to draft and 
pay for television scripts to promote the amendments, and made press statements on behalf of 
the network. Id. at 8, 28, 31, 48, 154; see MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., RULE OF LAW PROJECT: 
MEXICO 2ND QUARTER REPORT FY 2009 JANUARY 1ST–MARCH 31ST, 2009, at 2 (2009), available 
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACO420.pdf (noting that reform efforts are focused on 
Mexico’s criminal justice system); Letter from Jess. T. Ford, Assoc. Dir., Int’l Relations & Trade 
Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Cong. Requesters on Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule 
of Law Program Coordination 3 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/
89353.pdf; Weissman, supra note 54, at 849–56 (reviewing U.S. directed changes to Mexican 
national law primarily as a function of global economics and NAFTA); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 13; Rule of Law, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan. 
10, 2014), http://transition.usaid.gov/mx/ruleoflaweng.html. 
 75 About MSI, MGMT. SYS. INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/
MSI_one_page_eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Brigitte Claney, Coffey International 
Limited Awarded USD $66.3 Million USAID Rule of Law Project in Mexico, COFFEY (July 3, 
2009), http://www.coffey.com/our-news/media-releases/coffey-international-limited-awarded-
usd-66-3-million-usaid-rule-of-law-project-in-mexico (noting in a press release that 
MSI/Proderecho first worked on the passage of Mexican judicial reforms, and was now 
awarded a contract to implement these judicial reforms under the Mérida Initiative); MGMT. 
SCI. FOR DEV., http://www.msdglobal.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Strengthening Justice 
Systems in Mexico, MGMT. SYS. INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/project/strengthening-
justice-systems-in-mexico (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). MSD was also responsible for USAID 
Rule of Law programs as part of Plan Colombia. NANCY GARCÍA TAFOYA, MGMT. SCIS. FOR 
DEV., INC., PRODERECHO END OF YEAR REPORT FY 2008 (2008), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM744.pdf. 
 76 See MGMT. SYS. INT’L, supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also MSD/PRODERECHO, 
QUARTERLY REPORT JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PDACO077.pdf; SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 21; WILSON CTR., MEXICO 
INST., GROUP III—INSTITUTION BUILDING AND RULE OF LAW (2008), available at 
http://mexicoinstitute.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/merida-initiative-part2.pdf. 
 77 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 22, 24; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
STATUS OF FUNDS FOR THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 5, 14, 22, 24 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf. 
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Attorney General’s Office, improve extradition processes, enhance 
sentencing and other related criminal penalties, and assure Mexico’s 
ability to securely detain criminals.78 The International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs Agency has also been allocated Mérida funds 
to develop a “culture of lawfulness” in Mexico.79 
As an integral part of the Mérida Initiative, U.S. prosecutors, as 
well as U.S. law schools, have developed programs to instruct their 
Mexican counterparts to conduct “American-style” criminal trials.80 
Funds have been allocated to develop mock courtrooms, virtual 
classrooms, and courseware development.81 Curiously, the U.S. project 
has not attempted to reintroduce jury trials although Mexican citizens 
have a history of participation in the legal system via juries.82 The plan 
also calls for the training of non-government organizations and civil 
society groups about criminal procedures, protection of rights, and 
alternative case resolution programs.83 In a statement before a 
Congressional subcommittee, the Director of the USAID Mission to 
Mexico described the Mérida Initiative rule of law program as a way to 
assist Mexicans to “fundamentally change their entire justice system.”84 
 
 78 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 24; David T. Johnson, The Mérida Initiative: A New 
Security Cooperation Partnership, 18 NAT’L STRATEGY FORUM REV. (2009), available at 
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/NSFReview/Fall2009Vol18Issue3USMexico/LeadArticle
3.aspx.  
 79 EMBASSY OF THE U.S. IN MEXICO, supra note 9. 
 80 Wright, supra note 49, at 363, 381 (noting that a shift to an “accusatorial” system in 
Mexico was deemed appropriate by U.S. funders); see, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, School Helps 
Mexico Change Trial Process, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.globaltort.com/
2009/08/differences-in-legal-systems-mexico-and-the-us-on-criminal-law (describing Chicago-
Kent Law School’s involvement in reforming Mexico’s “ancient” criminal trial processes); see 
also HIGHER EDUC. FOR DEV., U.S.-MEXICO TRAINING, INTERNSHIPS, EXCHANGES, AND 
SCHOLARSHIP INITIATIVES (TIES): A MODEL FOR SUCCESS (2009), available at 
http://www.hedprogram.org/resources/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=3309; 
James E. Moliterno, Exporting American Legal Ethics, 43 AKRON L. REV. 769 (2010) (describing 
USAID funded ABA law school programs); Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Prosecutors Train in 
U.S. for Changes in Their Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at A12 . 
 81 See U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, FACT SHEET: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE-MAJOR DELIVERIES 
IN 2011 (2012), available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/23jan12/2011%20
Major%20Deliveries_2012.pdf; Karla Zabludovsky, In Mexico, Rehearsing to Inject Drama into 
the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at A7. 
 82 See Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a Key 
Component of Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Cross-National Analyses of Lay Judge Participation and 
the Search for Mexico’s Judicial Sovereignty, 16 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 40 (2010). The 
author’s review of all USAID reports, USAID statements, contractor reports, and GAO and 
Office of Inspector General reports on the Mérida Initiative Rule of Law project finds that they 
omit any reference to training or otherwise introducing anything related to jury trials. 
 83 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 77, at 22. 
 84 USAID/Mexico’s Role in the Mérida Initiative: Hearing Before H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, S. Comm. on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Roger D. Garner, USAID Mission Dir. to Mexico), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/statement-usaid-mission-
director-mexico-rodger-d-garner.  
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To that end, the Mérida Initiative seeks to redesign the very 
infrastructure of the administration of justice. Funds have been 
appropriated for case-tracking software, forensic laboratories, and 
related training for court system personnel and law enforcement.85 
Appropriations have been made, in the words of the Department of 
State, to “activate” new prisons; U.S. funds have been earmarked to 
increase the number of federal correctional facilities in Mexico from six 
to twenty-two and to improve the ability of the prison system to 
“manage violent, disruptive offenders.”86 Funds have also been allocated 
to enhance monitoring and interdiction activities, to revamp crime 
scene management, and to purchase and administer drug test kits.87 
USAID appropriations have been used to acquire biometric equipment 
in order to “capture and store the identification of criminal offenders,” 
for the creation of new units to track gang activities, and to develop 
classification systems of inmates.88 Additional rule of law monies have 
been designated to the Mexican Intelligence Service for the purpose of 
investigation, surveillance, and counter-terrorism.89 The largest 
allocations have gone to International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement and Foreign Military Financing.90 Other than General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and Inspector General Reports, overall 
monitoring and evaluation of the rule of law funding is controlled by 
USAID.91 
II.     LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT: THEN AND NOW 
For more than four decades, legal scholars have been analyzing the 
relationship between rule of law programs such as the Mérida Initiative 
 
 85 ERIC OLSON, WILSON CTR., SIX KEY ISSUES IN U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION 
(2008), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/six_issues_usmex_security_
coop.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 77, at 22. 
 86 Mérida Initiative at a Glance: Law Enforcement Achievements, U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, 
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_factsheet_lawenforcement.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 87 Id. 
 88 U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, supra note 81. 
 89 Laura Carlsen, A Primer on Plan Mexico, AMS. PROGRAM (May 5, 2008), 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1474. 
 90 THOMAS H. ISOM, PRI AND THE BEYOND MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555293 (report submitted by student, a 
Colonel in the U.S. Navy, at the Naval War College).  
 91 See HUGO CONCHA, WHERE THINGS STAND IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN 
MEXICO 11 (2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/hugo_concha_
justice_reform.pdf (noting the need for qualitative evaluation beyond numbers); Database 
Administrator, Mexico Rule of Law III, Mexico in Mérida, MEXICOJOBS77 (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.mexicojobs77.com/Database_Administrator_Mexico_Rule_of_Law_III_Mexico_
in_Merida-8299232.html. 
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and political economic concerns.92 John and Jean Comaroff have 
warned of a growing fetishism with the law, which has displaced politics 
as a means to address social disorder.93 They describe a “preoccupation 
with legalities, and with the legal subject” as a result of growing 
concerns with lawlessness and “post-colonial dis/order and its mass-
mediated representation.”94 Other scholars have suggested ways the 
demands for U.S.-style legal reform have served as a means to assure a 
particular type of economic development, one conducive to an 
expansion of U.S.-dominated corporate interests and global economic 
integration.95 The impetus behind rule of law projects has often been the 
belief that markets require predictable legal structures to protect 
property rights, facilitate foreign direct investments, and contract 
enforcement—that is, to establish U.S. law as the “lingua franca for 
business and politics.”96 Still others have referred to the unvaried 
exportation of the U.S. criminal justice system as an effort to achieve 
global governance through crime.97 Indeed, the very agencies funded to 
export the rule of law have been transformed into global intelligence 
agencies with purposes that transcend issues related to transnational 
crime.98 
 
 92 See generally David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, 
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
74 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Kerry Rittich, Who’s Afraid of the Critique of 
Adjudication?: Tracing the Discourse of Law in Development, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 929 (2001) 
(describing the historical development of the law and development movement as a means to 
strengthen market economies); Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 185 (2010). 
 93 Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 31. 
 94 Id. at 21; Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 1 (Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy & Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 30, 2002), 
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf (describing rule of law projects as a 
favorite item on donor laundry list of “good governance reforms”). 
 95 Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical 
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441 (2010) (noting both U.S. governmental and 
nongovernmental initiatives to promote the rule of law in developing countries); see also MARIA 
DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF 
REFORM 3 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/
4044168-1186409169154/20pub_br214.pdf; Roger C. Riddell, Is Aid Working? Is This the Right 
Question to be Asking?, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/roger-c-riddell/is-aid-working-is-this-right-question-to-be-
asking. 
 96 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 306, 307 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS]; Gordon, supra note 95, at 443. 
 97 Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 91–96 
(2010) (reviewing the literature on this point). 
 98 Ginger Thompson & Scott Shane, Cables Portray Expanded Reach of Drug Agency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at A1. 
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In the context of Latin America, the Mérida Initiative rule of law 
program may be best understood as a political instrument designed to 
accomplish the varied goals described above, particularly when 
considered through a historical lens. The United States has long 
imposed its will in order to influence the passage of legislation within 
the boundaries of sovereign states or has otherwise enacted domestic 
laws with extraterritorial reach—all in defense of national interests—
and nowhere more so than in Latin America.99 As historian Greg 
Grandin has written, Latin America “has long served as a workshop of 
empire” in ways that are critical to the expansive global power of the 
United States.100 Many U.S. multinational corporations originated in 
Latin America, and much of the region’s economic growth was financed 
by U.S. banks and investors.101 In addition, nation building through 
legal reforms has almost always accompanied military intervention and 
has functioned as a means through which to expand and protect U.S. 
security, economic, and domestic political interests.102 An examination 
of the history of such programs illustrates that despite the discursive 
shift from an emphasis on militarization to institution-building, the 
Mérida Initiative rule of law program may best be understood as “a 
political weapon to achieve American goals.”103 
A.     The Mérida Initiative’s Rule of Law Program: Template Redux 
The Mérida Initiative reflects long-established practices by which 
the United States has engaged in directing the legal affairs of other 
countries, including preparing new constitutions, organizing legislative 
bodies, codifying laws, and establishing judicial systems.104 The United 
States significantly increased funding for judicial reform projects in 
Latin America in the last fifty years.105 U.S. law reform efforts embedded 
 
 99 CRAIG ARCENEAUX & DAVID PION-BERLIN, TRANSFORMING LATIN AMERICA: THE 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF CHANGE 52 (2005). 
 100 GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE U.S. AND THE RISE OF NEW 
IMPERIALISM 1–2 (Henry Holt and Company 2006). 
 101 Id. at 17. 
 102 Id. at 26, 87–120 (describing U.S. initiatives to organize paramilitary insurrections or 
facilitate military coups throughout Latin America in order to suppress leftist political 
movements and maintain interests and power tied to authoritarian and free market 
governments). 
 103 Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos & Silvina Maria Romano, Political-Economic Factors in U.S. 
Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative, and the Obama Administration, 38 
LATIN AM. PERSP. 93, 95 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian 
Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 279 (2004); see also Bryant G. Garth, Exporting and 
Importing Democracy, Law and Human Rights, NACLA REP. AM., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 29, 30. 
 105 Bonner, supra note 2, at 169. In 1961, the United States established the Alliance for 
Progress for the purpose of establishing U.S.-style legal systems. McLeod, supra note 97, at 84; 
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in the Alliance for Progress, a Cold War project designed to counteract 
revolutionary movements, employed a comprehensive set of strategies 
throughout the region to shift the methods and structure of legal 
education to a U.S. model, to fashion the legal profession and retrain 
attorneys to fit the prototype of a U.S. lawyer, and to reshape 
jurisprudential philosophy.106 As a foreign aid/foreign policy strategy, 
the United States sought to “ensure that Latin America developed in 
ways that strengthened pro-U.S. politicians and created economic 
conditions that would limit the appeal of anti-U.S. or pro Communist 
forces.”107 
The United States has promoted judicial reform strategies as a form 
of development assistance and, as with the Mérida Initiative, has often 
linked military aid with funding for rule of law programs. The exporting 
of criminal law American-style was part of the U.S. counter-insurgency 
measures in El Salvador during the 1980s in function of U.S. “domestic 
politics, and the geopolitical needs and agenda of the Reagan 
administration.”108 The Mérida Initiative shares much in common with 
Plan Colombia: a counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics policy 
designed to strengthen judicial institutions, enhance criminal 
prosecution, and simultaneously shape military strategies.109 
So too with Ecuador. In the late 1990s, the United States increased 
foreign aid to Ecuador, including counter-drug funds. In exchange for 
the aid, Ecuador was obligated to allow the United States to host an 
expanded U.S. military presence within its territory and enact new penal 
laws that included mandatory minimum sentences based on U.S. 
guidelines that violated Ecuador’s long-held legal norms and 
constitutional protections.110 Ecuador was also required to document a 
rise in the rates of persons detained for drug offenses regardless of 
 
see MARTHA L. COTTAM, IMAGES AND INTERVENTION: U.S. POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 83 
(2009). 
 106 JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN 
LATIN AMERICA 4 (1980); see also Garth, supra note 104, at 29–30. 
 107 JEFFREY F. TAFFET, FOREIGN AID AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN 
LATIN AMERICA 2 (2007). 
 108 Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal 
Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 649 (2007); see also MARGARET POPKIN, 
PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN EL SALVADOR 71 
(2000) (noting the failure of such efforts). 
 109 HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 43, at 7 (noting the protection of a pipeline as motivation 
for Plan Colombia); John Lindsay-Poland, Retreat to Colombia: The Pentagon Adapts its Latin 
American Strategy, NACLA REP. AM., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 22, 23 (noting how such efforts then 
facilitated the moving of other civilian functions into the hands of the military).  
 110 SANDRA G. EDWARDS & COLETTA A. YOUNGERS, DRUG LAW REFORM IN ECUADOR: 
BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE, BALANCED AND REALISTIC APPROACH 4, 5 
(2010), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/
2011/Spanish/joint%20pubs/ecuador%20memo.pdf. 
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whether the numbers of individuals involved in trafficking illegal drugs 
had also risen.111 
Judicial reform in Latin America was also mandated by the 
Washington Consensus institutions and funded by loans that required 
structural adjustment programs, the downsizing of government, and the 
privatization of state functions.112 Mexico was a particular focus of 
World Bank directives to assure the responsiveness of Mexico’s judicial 
system to economic liberalization strategies.113 While efforts have 
focused on forging a judicial system disposed to ratify economic 
liberalization strategies and enhancing the capacity of the criminal 
justice and penal systems, social justice issues have been ignored. 
Protections of the rights of labor or improvements to family law, for 
example, have not been a priority of the funding entities.114 
B.     Assessment of Mérida’s Rule of Law Program’s Antecedents 
The outcomes of the various rule of law programs in Latin America 
have been assessed by a number of scholars. James A. Gardner closely 
examined U.S. legal assistance programs associated with the Alliance for 
Progress.115 Gardner served as a Ford Foundation official and 
participated in the funding of many of these projects. He determined 
that such efforts were routinely rejected by Latin Americans as U.S.-
ethnocentric and were inapplicable to the circumstances where they 
were being implemented (“not a cure but a disease”).116 Gardner found 
U.S. lawyers were unprepared and unfamiliar with the language, 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 3, 
28–34 (2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/
3817166-1185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf (documenting judicial 
reform efforts by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank). 
 113 Weissman, supra note 54, at 849. 
 114 See DAKOLIAS, supra note 95, at 3; KIRSTI SAMUELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-
CONFLICT COUNTRIES: OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND LESSONS LEARNT 33 (World Bank, Soc. 
Dev. Paper No. 37, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/
WP37_web.pdf; Peter DeShazo & Juan Enrique Vargas, Judicial Reform in Latin America: An 
Assessment, 17 POL’Y PAPERS AM. 8, 14 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/0609_latin_judicial_reform.pdf; Alexis James Gilman, Making 
Amends with the Mexican Constitution: Reassessing the 1995 Judicial Reforms and Considering 
Prospects for Further Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 956 (2003); Thomas W. Slover, 
Tequila Sunrise: Has Mexico Emerged from the Darkness of Financial Crisis?, 5 NAFTA: L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 91, 99, 117–18 (1999); Jorge A. Vargas, An Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law: 
From Constitutions and Codes to Legal Culture and NAFTA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1337, 1339 
(2004); Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side 
Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 419–20 (1995). 
 115 See generally GARDNER, supra note 106. 
 116 Id. at 11, 233, 241, 245 (noting the expectation that Latin American lawyers would have 
to “know and have the very feel of the American concept of law if peace through law is to be 
achieved” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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economics, politics, culture, and legal structures.117 U.S.-style rule of law 
programs, he noted, failed to produce reforms, contribute to political 
democracy, or economic development, but instead fostered the 
perception that law functioned as a repressive mechanism.118 
Researchers have also criticized Plan Colombia’s “judicialization” 
efforts for encouraging “overzealous mass arrests” of civilians and 
harming community relations.119 U.S. funds were used for smear 
campaigns against Colombian Supreme Court justices as well as labor 
organizations and civil society groups.120 One scholar who helped to 
direct a human rights project in Colombia has observed that Colombia’s 
“Justice and Peace Law” program, funded by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, contributed to the remobilization of paramilitary forces.121 
Others have suggested that Colombia’s rule of law program served to 
provide a rationale for military funding, and diminished respect for the 
rule of law while contributing to a humanitarian disaster.122 
Ecuadorean compliance with U.S.-imposed rule of law conditions 
requiring increased numbers of arrests resulted in an unprecedented 
rise in the imprisonment of the most vulnerable sectors of society and 
violated long-held legal precepts about crime and punishment.123 
Evaluations of efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala have reached 
similar conclusions: Where U.S. rule of law programs have been 
introduced to protect U.S. national interests, they have been largely 
inimical to the interests of the people living in these countries.124 
 
 117 Id. at 4–5. 
 118 Id. at 4–6, 105–06, 280, 283; see also Moliterno, supra note 80, at 769, 771 (noting how a 
rule of law project to export the ABA Model Code of Judicial Ethics became the means to 
subvert the independence of the judiciary in Georgia). 
 119 ADAM ISACSON & ABIGAIL POE, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y, AFTER PLAN COLOMBIA: 
EVALUATING “INTEGRATED ACTION,” THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S ASSISTANCE 17 (2009), available 
at http://justf.org/files/pubs/091203_col.pdf. 
 120 Karen DeYoung & Claudia J. Duque, A Case of Aid Gone Bad in Colombia, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 21, 2011, at A01. 
 121 Milburn Line, Retooling U.S. Policy for Peace in Colombia, PEACE & JUST. POL’Y BRIEF, 
Feb. 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/documents/ipj/
Policy_Brief_Colombia_2011.pdf (describing the failure of efforts to prosecute paramilitaries 
for atrocities committed against civilians and their eventual release and return to criminal 
activities). 
 122 HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 43, at 26; María Clemencia Ramírez Lemus et al., 
Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War, in DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: 
THE IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY 99, 132–33 (Coletta A. Youngers & Eileen Rosen eds., 2005). 
Colombia now has the greatest number of displaced persons of any other country in the world 
except Sudan. Forrest Hylton, Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success, 17 BROWN J. OF WORLD 
AFF. 99, 108 (2010); Line, supra note 121, at 1.  
 123 EDWARDS & YOUNGERS, supra note 110, at 5. In 2009, as a result of these conditions and 
their consequences, Ecuador terminated the foreign aid arrangement. Id. at 4. 
 124 See ANTHONY K. STAPLETON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE U.S. QUEST FOR SECURITY IN 
EL SALVADOR 9, 77 (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a468788.pdf 
(report submitted by student at the Joint Forces Staff College noting the misplaced efforts to 
protect U.S national security interests from threats of transnational organized crime). 
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Moreover, the conditions attached to Washington Consensus funds 
allocated to Mexico that required cuts in public spending and the 
privatization of public functions could not have helped but to 
undermine the capacity of the Mexican government to carry out its law 
and order responsibilities.125 
C.     Rule of Law Programs: “The New Moral Imperative” 
Despite critical assessments of past efforts, the United States 
continues to endeavor to remake the legal systems in other parts of the 
world. Recently, the specter of transnational crime has become the “new 
moral imperative[]” for extraterritorial intervention in the form of rule 
of law programs.126 U.S. politicians have described foreign drug 
trafficking and organized crime as “the new communism, the new 
monolithic threat” requiring a heightened criminal justice response.127 
USAID’s assistant administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean 
declared that crime was now considered “the leading threat in some 
countries to economic growth and the leading threat to democracy.”128 
The United States has established the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance and Training to “assist prosecutors and 
judicial personnel in other countries develop and sustain effective 
criminal justice institutions” and boasts that it “provides justice sector 
development assistance in practically every region of the world.”129 
International criminal drug-related cases have developed into a 
 
Salvadorans understood that the U.S. rule of law program was a counterinsurgency mechanism 
and “political tool” and thus not trusted. Id. at 9, 47; Rachel Sider, Renegotiating “Law and 
Order”: Judicial Reform and Citizen Responses in Post War Guatemala, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 
137, 145, 151–53 (2003) (observing that nearly all Guatemalans have no trust in the very 
institutions that USAID partnered with and instead have resorted to alternative forms of 
justice); see also SAMUELS, supra note 114, at 14 (noting studies that demonstrated no real 
evidence of improvement). 
 125 ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2003) (describing the conditions attached to IMF and 
World Bank funding including privatization, cuts to public funding, and deregulation); see 
MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD 
BANK REFORMS 15 (1997) (describing structural adjustment policies that require the 
dismantling of state institutions). 
 126 Peter Andreas, The Rise of the American Crimefare State, 14 WORLD POL’Y J. 37, 40 
(1997) (quoting ETHAN NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 475 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 Cave & Schmidt, supra note 73 (quoting Mark Feierstein, Asst. Admin. for Latin Am. & 
the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129 Our Mission, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance & Training, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see 
Mission Statement, Strategic Plan, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance & 
Training, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/about/strategic-
plan.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
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significant part of the caseload of local U.S. federal prosecutors’ offices 
that pursue these matters even in the absence of proof that drugs have 
entered the United States and that defendants have posed national 
security threats.130 
Perhaps most notably, rule of law programs are concomitant 
aspects of a larger military strategy. In its field manual on 
counterinsurgency, the Department of Defense has identified rule of law 
campaigns as critical measures to establish the legitimacy of U.S. 
intervention and efforts to influence political power.131 Rule of law 
programs that focus on strengthening the criminal justice system 
(“courts, cops, and corrections”) have been a key intervention strategy 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.132 In Pakistan, U.S. intelligence agencies plan 
and assist with local criminal prosecution to control public opinion 
about alleged insurgents.133 Moreover, U.S. military forces, as opposed 
to civilian agencies, lead such programs relying on their ability to 
“command and control.”134 Military equipment and technology have 
been adapted as extensions of law-related functions.135 
 
 130 Benjamin Weiser, For Prosecutor in New York, A Global Beat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, 
at A1 (describing “the expanded global reach of” the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern 
District of New York). 
 131 David P. Fidler, Counterinsurgency, Rule Of Law Operations, and International Law, 
ASIL INSIGHTS, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.asil.org/insights070919.cfm (noting that 
rule of law campaigns as have been central to counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan); see David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, Foreword: Counterinsurgency, FIELD 
MANUAL NO. 3-24/MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5 (2006), available at 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf (asserting that counter-
insurgency strategies must include the establishment of the rule of law); Bonner, supra note 2, 
at 169; Jim Michaels, U.S. Military Works with Mexico’s: Passes on Skills to Help Fight Drug 
Traffickers, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 2010, at 7A (reporting on comments of military commanders 
on the similarities between intervention strategies among Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mexico); US 
Military Chief Backs Counter-Insurgency for Mexico, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:47 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06397194; see also Bacevich, supra note 2, at 7; John 
Lindsay-Poland, Beyond the Drug War: The Pentagon’s Other Operations in Latin America, 
NACLA REP. AM., May/June 2011, at 8, 11 (noting that various humanitarian projects, 
including medical and veterinary services, are linked to U.S. military missions as public 
relations ploys, according to military spokespersons, to “show[] the military in a different light” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 132 Ronald T.P. Alcala, Vanquishing Paper Tigers: Applying Comparative Law Methodology 
to Enhance Rule of Law Development, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2011, at 5, 8 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 133 James J. Saulino, Strategic Choices: Four Legal Models for Counterterrorism in Pakistan, 2 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 247, 252 n.16 (2011). 
 134 Alcala, supra note 132, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135 Andreas, supra note 126, at 41–42. These developments suggest that the field of law may 
rival the field of anthropology in service of military counterinsurgency efforts. See generally 
CATHERINE BESTEMAN ET AL., THE COUNTER-COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL: OR, NOTES ON 
DEMILITARIZING AMERICAN SOCIETY (2009) (critiquing the role of anthropology in 
counterinsurgency strategies); John D. Kelly et al., Introduction: Culture, Counterinsurgency, 
Conscience, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCY 1 (John D. Kelly et al. eds., 
2010). 
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These efforts have spawned what some have called a “[r]ule of Law 
industry” dominated by “rule doctors” that has yielded vast profits to 
U.S. contractors.136 National and local bar organizations, law schools, 
private foundations, together with USAID, the DOJ, and other federal 
entities have invested in exporting U.S. legal principles in support of 
democracy and free market economies throughout the world.137 The 
United States serves as a ready and willing donor to continue to fund 
rule of law projects to Americanize other judicial systems.138 These 
programs tend to ignore local initiatives for legal change.139 That the 
decisions about the nature of the aid are determined more by the 
political and economic interests of the U.S. donors than the needs of the 
recipient nation reflects the use of law as a political instrument, 
notwithstanding a record of having failed to produce meaningful justice 
systems.140 
III.     TRANSPLANTING THE RULE OF LAW: CONTEXT AND DIFFERENCES 
Legal systems develop and function within a historical context. 
They evolve from, and are embedded in, cultural systems and 
socioeconomic structures. They transform and are transformed 
continually within real-life in which they are to be implemented. Laws 
do not merely function as a body of rules to be enforced by a judicial 
system, but rather both produce, and are products of, a legal value 
system that is itself a distillation of moral order of society and that go 
 
 136 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction to GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96, 
at 1; Jean MacKenzie, Afghan Women and the Rule of Law Conundrum, GLOBAL POST (Mar. 7, 
2012, 6:14 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/
120306/afghan-women-and-the-rule-law-conundrum. 
 137 Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 743–44 (1999); see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Michael Hamilton, Gender and 
The Rule of Law in Transitional Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 380, 382–83 (2009) (arguing that 
rule of law programs “represent[] merely the ego-image of its most ardent proponents”). 
 138 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 306. The North American Consortium for Legal 
Education was originally established to focus on NAFTA related subject matters. See N. AM. 
CONSORTIUM FOR LEGAL EDUC., OPERATING AGREEMENT 3 (1999), available at 
http://www.nacle.org/sites/default/files/525_Operating_agreement.pdf. 
 139 Craig Segal, Note, The Forestry Crisis as a Crisis of the Rule of Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1539, 1561 (2006); see infra Part III.B. 
 140 Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 104 (1998) (stating that 
it is donors who often determine the rule of law reform priorities); Mariana Prado & Michael 
Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 341, 347 (2009) (noting the commonplace failure of rule of law programs); 
Upham, supra note 94, at 1. 
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beyond conflict resolution.141 They reflect ideological principles and 
emanate from the political and economic institutions of place.142 
Efforts to transfer legal standards from developed countries to less 
developed countries have been the subject of long-standing critique, 
particularly given the ubiquity with which legal transplantation now 
occurs under circumstances of globalization.143 The Global Legal 
Standards Research Group determined that the United States has 
continued to replicate its systems based on belief of its inherent 
superiority, regardless of whether the normative frameworks 
inextricably associated with particular legal codes are suitable for 
transport.144 A comparative study of the transplantation of criminal 
codes from one country (or international institution) to another country 
found that the introduction of new laws by outsiders were always 
accompanied by a set of assumptions from the exporting country with 
questionable relevance to the recipient country.145 Michael Walzer has 
urged that different goods, including justice have different social 
meanings which shape their value: “[j]ustice is rooted in the distinct 
understanding of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute 
a shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act 
unjustly.”146 
These critiques point to the flaws inherent in the Mérida Initiative. 
The Mexico rule of law program seeks to transplant a system that by its 
very nature is foundational to nationhood and cannot readily take root 
except through the efforts of the local polity according to its history and 
traditions.147 Laws must emanate from local social and political 
 
 141 Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin Legal Cultures in the Age of 
Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 2 (Lawrence M. Friedman 
& Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003). 
 142 See David Kennedy, Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 7, 
9, 12 (2013). 
 143 John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreward, 26 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 305, 306 (2001) (referring to the colonial rationale, in the name of “progress” to 
impose a “civilized” judicial system (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gordon, supra note 
95, at 444; Idlir Peçi & Evert Stamhuis, Judicial Interpretation and Substantive Legality in 
Criminal Law: A Comparative Study on Distribution of Power in Albania and The Netherlands, 
17 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 113, 114 (2009). 
 144 See The Global Legal Standards Report, At the End of the End of History—Global Legal 
Standards: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, 9 GLOBAL JURIST 5 (2009) [hereinafter 
Global Legal Standards Report], available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss3/art2 (noting 
the local nature of justice that shapes local identifies); Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 307 
(noting that the United States is “the leading exporter of rules”). 
 145 Peçi & Stamhuis, supra note 143, at 114; see Alex de Waal, Protecting Civilians in Fragile 
States, Presentation to Oxfam-Novib, The Hague (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 
https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups#!topic/sudan-john-
ashworth/pZFFACXMP_A (noting that countries cannot be made to work “from the inside 
with an outside template” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 146 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 7, 314 
(1983). 
 147 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances, even as Mexicans may choose to adopt and borrow from 
external systems as their circumstances may require.148  
A.     The United States and Mexico: Legal Systems and Differences that 
Matter 
An assessment of the U.S. law reform project in Mexico requires an 
appreciation of the historical and political differences in legal systems 
and legal cultures.149 Mexican legal traditions include ongoing attention 
to indigenous rights, constitutionally designed cooperative land use, 
corporative models of labor relations, and legal pluralism.150 The 
Mexican Constitution of 1917, the conceptual political and judicial 
foundation for the nation, is formulated upon a commitment to social 
rights more so than most constitutions.151 The Mexican Constitution 
was a product of the revolution of 1910 from which it gained its 
“[r]evolutionary legitimacy.”152 It created social property rights (ejidos) 
and included laws designed to guarantee a form of collective title held 
by those who worked the land.153 A textual reading reveals broad 
protections of civil rights and prohibitions on discrimination against 
“human dignity or individual rights or liberties,” which include gender, 
civil status, or ethnic origin.154 The Mexican Constitution commits to a 
right to education and health care.155 As a foundational document, the 
 
 148 Pilar Domingo, Novel Appropriations of the Law in the Pursuit of Political and Social 
Change in Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 254, 255 (Javier A. Couso et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CULTURES 
OF LEGALITY] (changes in laws are “historically, culturally and politically situated”); Alexandra 
Huneeus et al., Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary 
Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY 3 (noting the ever shifting and contentious nature of 
legal culture); Global Legal Standards Report, supra note 144, at 5 (noting the local nature of 
justice that shapes local identifies). 
 149 SAMUELS, supra note 114, at 15 (noting that a review of rule of law programs conducted 
in 2006 revealed few lasting changes and few improvements from the earlier efforts to bring 
about legal system changes). 
 150 See Domingo, supra note 148, at 263. 
 151 ARIADNA ESTÉVEZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO: A DISCURSIVE 
SOCIOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 61 (2008). 
 152  Sergio López-Alyllón & Héctor Fix-Fierro, “Faraway, So Close!” The Rule of Law and 
Legal Change in Mexico, 1970–2000, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION supra 
note 141, at 285, 293. 
 153 Id. at 288–89 (noting that the 1917 Mexican Constitution incorporated liberal legal 
traditions); Judith Schacherreiter, Un Mundo Donde Quepan Muchos Mundos: A Postcolonial 
Legal Perspective Inspired by the Zapatistas, 9 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 13–14 (2009). But see DAVID 
BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES 
IMMIGRANTS 58 (2008) (noting that as a function of NAFTA-related requirements, Article 27 of 
the Mexican Constitution was amended and ejidos may now be sold). 
 154 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] (Mex.).  
 155 Children’s Rights: Mexico, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-
rights/mexico.php#executive (last updated Feb. 28, 2014).  
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constitution functions as a signpost of safeguards and rights that gives 
rise to unique expectations derived from the text. 
Scholars have explored the fundamental philosophical differences 
related to legal culture that distinguish Mexico and the United States.156 
Mexico has implemented a civil law system based on an inquisitorial 
model, an approach that creates different expectations about justice. The 
inquisitorial system has as its theoretical basis the premise that 
outcomes will be determined with “little distortion by partisan legal 
representatives.”157 Judges are considered “career civil servants” rather 
than “independent political forces.”158 The historical preference for 
written trials has been based on concern that oral trials would allow a 
more accomplished or powerful lawyer to overcome a less competent 
advocate notwithstanding principles of justice at hand.159 
Mexico has ratified and, at times, has been far more influenced by 
human rights norms than the United States.160 Along with much of 
Latin America, it has contributed to the development of regional and 
international human rights treaties, many of which the United States has 
eschewed.161 In 1990, it created a national commission on human rights 
with the highest annual budget of any ombudsman’s office in the 
Americas.162 Mexican legal values have been further influenced by 
liberation theology, concerns wholly absent from U.S. legal culture.163 
Other differences mark variance in legal culture between the 
United States and Mexico. The Mexican judicial system has no death 
 
 156 See Paul J. Zwier & Alexander Barney, Moving to an Oral-Adversarial System in Mexico: 
Jurisprudential, Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, and Trial Advocacy Implications, 26 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 189, 194–96, 200–02 (2012) (comparing Mexico’s legal culture of legal positivism 
with philosophical principles that underlie oral trials practiced in the United States). 
 157 John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (1974); 
Wright, supra note 49, at 369. 
 158 Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 715, 765 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159 Zwier & Barney, supra note 156, at 203. 
 160 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MEXICO–MÉRIDA INITIATIVE REPORT 15, available at 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33501 (noting that Mexico has taken steps to implement the 
Istanbul Protocol, is a party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, and 
has established National Mechanisms to Prevent Torture). 
 161 Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the 
Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 29–31, 38 (2003). The United States 
has refused to ratify the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and denies the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission or Court of Human Rights. See American 
Convention on Human Rights, Signatures and Current Ratification, ORG. AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/4.RATIFICATIONS%20AMERICAN%20
CONVENTION.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
 162 HUMAN RTS. WATCH, MEXICO’S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
10–12 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0208webw
cover.pdf. Human Rights Watch, while criticizing the Commission for certain weaknesses, 
notes its contributions, including raising public awareness about human rights violations in 
Mexico. Id. at 16. 
 163 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 61. 
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penalty.164 Mexico has strict gun control laws, although they have been 
eroded by the ease with which the United States sells weapons that find 
their way into the hands of drug-cartel members.165 The country has 
historically been associated with pro-labor legislation.166 Long-standing 
values about communitarian obligations to help offset personal losses 
have shaped Mexican tort law where tort victims look to be made whole 
through social and governmental supports that do not depend on 
adversarial litigation.167 Much of what might otherwise be consigned to 
the legal system for resolution in the United States functions differently 
within or is often resolved through normative transformations wholly 
outside of the law.168 Where formal legal processes are required, a 
significant number of Mexicans have indicated a preference for greater 
lay participation in the legal system.169 Legal education differs in most 
respects from U.S. pedagogical approaches; most recent reforms have 
encouraged an interdisciplinary and problem-solving approach to 
curricular innovations.170 
Legal cultural differences are as relevant to the Mérida Initiative’s 
purported plan to improve access to justice and protect rights as they 
 
 164 Prisoners are generally allowed greater freedoms within penitentiaries when compared 
with prison life in the United States, including same-sex conjugal visits. Mexico Allows Gay 
Conjugal Visits, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2007, 11:08 AM), http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/
6922140.stm; see Symposia, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the 
Americas, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 16 (1999) (remarks from U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, 
Jeffrey Davidow, noting that Mexico has undergone significant legal reforms with regard to 
improving human rights for prisoners); Mexican Prisons, FOREIGN PRISONER SUPPORT SERVICE, 
http://www.phaseloop.com/foreignprisoners/prison-mexico.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) 
(noting the rights to conjugal visits for men and women, and an inmate’s right in some 
instances to have his entire family reside with him). 
 165 See Laura Mehalko, Note, This Is Gun Country: The International Implications of U.S. 
Gun Control Policy, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 301 (2012). 
 166 Jeremy Adelman & Miguel Angel Centeno, Between Liberalism and Neoliberalism: Law’s 
Dilemma in Latin America, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96, at 139, 151; Weissman, 
supra note 54, at 851. 
 167 STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 527–28 (2004). 
 168 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 70 (suggesting that core human rights work defined within 
the realm of structural causes tends to take place outside of the courts due to the difficulty of 
litigating economic, social, and cultural rights). 
 169 Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Is Mexico Ready for a Jury Trial? Comparative Analysis of Lay 
Justice Systems in Mexico, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Ireland, 2 
MEX. L. REV. 3, 5 (2011). 
 170 Kossick, supra note 158, at 731–36. Mexico’s law schools require students to contribute a 
prescribed number of pro bono hours in order to graduate in contrast with U.S. law schools 
where such requirement exists on an ad hoc basis. Larissa Adler Lomnitz & Rodrigo Salazar, 
Cultural Elements in the Practice of Law in Mexico: Informal Networks in a Formal System, in 
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96, at 209, 225 (describing six months of required unpaid 
work for students to “give back”); James F. Smith et al., Why Mexico? Why Mexico Law? Why 
Now?, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 373, 380–81 (2005). 
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are to the efforts to redesign Mexico’s criminal justice system.171 Public 
interest law (PIL) in Latin America generally follows a “socialized” 
practice tradition that differs from PIL in the United States.172 Empirical 
studies demonstrate that in contrast with U.S. lawyers, Latin American 
lawyers prefer “empowering social action that challenges the existing 
arrangements of power” and “associate PIL practice with forms of 
collective and social mobilization more than with legal mobilization” of 
the type associated with U.S. lawyers.173 Legal activists throughout Latin 
America are more likely to successfully pursue the adjudication of 
socioeconomic rights than their counterparts in the United States.174 
Mexican human rights groups have contextualized torture and 
extrajudicial execution within the context of economic, cultural, and 
social rights as opposed to most U.S. human rights groups who 
approach such crimes as civil and political violations.175 They often seek 
to address violations of civil and political rights through the 
improvement of worker rights and the strengthening of labor unions.176 
Mexican scholars have urged the construction of law-related human 
rights norms as a process of “epistemological decolonization” based on 
concepts developed through “the region’s social reality, more 
specifically, in the lessons of its major revolutions: the populist 
movements of Perón and Cárdenas; the Cuban socialist revolution; the 
Chilean democratic revolution for human rights; the Sandinista 
revolution for democratic socialism; the Zapatista movement for 
indigenous rights and democracy . . .”177 
To acknowledge the progressive facets of Mexican legal culture 
does not mitigate the current deficiencies and the ways in which the 
Mexican legal system fails to fulfill its promise.178 The Mexican 
constitution has functioned more as a matter of principle rather than a 
 
 171 Although suffering from serious deficiencies, public defenders are assigned to represent 
individuals who cannot afford private counsel in both criminal and civil matters. Kossick, supra 
note 158, at 791–92. 
 172 Fabio de Sa e Silva, Professional Ideology and the Global Journey of Public Interest Law: 
Variations in the Meaning of Advocacy Among PIL Practitioners in the US and Latin America 17 
(2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author). 
 173 Id. at 9. 
 174 César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2011). 
 175 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 66–67, 69. Although there are a growing number of U.S. 
lawyers who have sought to frame domestic and poverty related legal issues as human rights 
issues, Mexican judicial activists likely have greater experience in this realm than their U.S. 
counterparts. See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 174, at 1674. 
 176 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 67 (noting that Mexican human rights groups identified 
human rights issues in Mexico in the context of a workers’ movement). 
 177 Id. at 15. 
 178 See supra Part I.B. 
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matter of practice.179 It has failed to sustain the expectations of the 
revolution that inspired its original articles. Recent legislative proposals 
would diminish the rights of unions, which have never fully benefited 
from historical progressive labor laws.180 The Mexican criminal justice 
system suffers from many deficiencies: public defenders with less 
political power compared with prosecuting attorneys and case 
overloads, inadequate interpretation services, abusive detention 
practices, and corruption, just to name a few.181 
But the differences matter. Just as the U.S. rule of law model is a 
unique “historical product embedded in U.S. politics and the U.S. social 
structure,” so too does Mexico’s legal culture reflect a unique history 
and tradition.182 Given these differences, and the political, economic, 
and military motivations associated with the rule of law project, the 
Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program may contribute to undermining 
the legitimacy of the law itself.183 Moreover, as next described, U.S. 
efforts to direct the reform of the Mexican legal system run counter to 
current efforts by the Mexican polity to address issues pertaining to 
crime, justice, and law.184 
 
 179 Domingo, supra note 148, at 259 (noting that it represents “the first truly social 
constitution of the twentieth century” and well ahead of European nations). 
 180 Dan La Botz & Robin Alexander, Unions Oppose Labor Law Reform: For Quite Different 
Reasons, 17 MEX. LAB. NEWS & ANALYSIS, (2012), available at http://www.ueinternational.org/
MLNA/mlna_articles.php? id=205#1498. 
 181 INGRAM ET AL., supra note 54, at 8, 10; Alicia Ely Yarmin & Pilar Noriega Garcia, Absence 
of the Rule of Law Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 483 (1999). Of course, many of these deficiencies are the same 
as those in the United States. See Monica Davey, In Missouri, State Budget Problems Take Toll 
on Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A15 (describing declining resources 
for public defenders causing their offices to refuse cases, and suffers from such overwhelming 
caseloads that provide “nothing more than the illusion of a lawyer”); Ian Urbina & Sean D. 
Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at 
A22 (describing two judges who sentenced juveniles without counsel or due process to privately 
owned detention centers in exchange for payment of money); see also CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, 
INJUSTICE: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE COURTROOMS OF AMERICA (2012) (detailing corruption and 
bribery involving a capital case). 
 182 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Corporate Law Firms, NGOs, and Issues of Legitimacy 
for a Global Legal Order, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2309, 2316 (2012). Moreover, notwithstanding 
the deficiencies in the legal system, studies demonstrate that among some sectors of Mexican 
society, support for the traditional Mexican legal system remains firm. INGRAM ET AL., supra 
note 54, at 3, 13. 
 183 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 182, at 2345. 
 184 Boaventura De Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum and the Global Left, 36 POL. & 
SOC’Y 247, 252 (2008) (noting that even the “conventional left” would be wanting both 
theoretically and analytically to interpret the needs of the social movements in Latin American 
and the Global South generally). 
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B.     The Mérida Initiative Versus Mexican Reforms: Trending 
Differences 
To be sure, the Mexican judicial system needs fixing. The question 
is how and who is best fitted to enact legal reforms to address the 
dynamic context within which the rise in crime and drug cartels has 
occurred.185 Mexican legal experts, human rights activists, and citizens 
have not ignored the structural deficiencies of the criminal justice 
system. On the contrary, scholars and human rights activists have 
consistently raised the need for legal reform and called for a 
strengthened judiciary as fundamental to the elimination of drug-cartel 
violence and the improvement of the social fabric of society.186 In fact, as 
this Part demonstrates, actual or proposed legal reforms are underway 
that are not only independent of, but are at variance with, the Mérida 
Initiative rule of law program. 
1.     United States Funded Reforms: Power to the Prosecutor 
The Mérida Initiative’s funding of institution-building focuses 
primarily on strengthening Mexico’s justice system.187 Reports that 
analyze the Mérida Initiative reveal that “rule of law” funds have been 
allocated principally to enhance criminal prosecutorial functions 
through training and technical support.188 In fact, USAID and its rule of 
law collaborators have concentrated almost entirely on the training of 
prosecutors.189 Congressional reports that track Department of Justice 
funding disclose that $19 million has been allocated to prosecutorial 
functions; additional funding for USAID since the inception of Phase II 
has been reserved for the training of prosecutors.190 State Department 
“fact sheets” that feature Mérida Initiative achievements itemize such 
 
 185 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 186 Stephanie Erin Brewer, Structural Human Rights Violations: The True Face of Mexico’s 
War on Crime, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 7, 10 (2009). 
 187 OLSON, supra note 85, at 2 (identifying funding allocation for information technology, 
the improvement of court management and prosecutorial capacity, victim and witness 
protection and restitution programs, and forensics); see also WILSON CTR., supra note 76. 
 188 OLSON, supra note 85; SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 24 (describing U.S. State 
Department and USAID funding focused on increasing prosecutorial capacity building and 
other law enforcement mechanisms); see also WILSON CTR., supra note 76. 
 189 See, e.g., U.S.-MEX. STATE ALLIANCE P’SHIP, QUARTERLY REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, APRIL 1, 
2011–JUNE 30, 2011, 3D QUARTER REPORT 6–18, 21 (2011), available at 
http://www.statealliancepartnership.org/activities_files/3_quarter_report_FY201011.pdf 
(detailing almost exclusively trainings for prosecutors); see also William Hine-Ramsberger, 
Note, Drug Violence and Constitutional Revisions: Mexico’s 2008 Criminal Justice Reform and 
the Formation of Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 291, 315 (2011) (noting that the reforms 
“perpetuate the expansive power of the public prosecutor”). 
 190 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 25 n.131. 
WEISSMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:31 PM 
1502 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1471 
 
accomplishments all in the realm of prosecution and punishment.191 
The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs described rule of law efforts in Mexico as 
synonymous with enhancing the ability to prosecute, convict, and 
incarcerate.192 
The U.S. focus on strengthening prosecutorial efforts reveals both 
an ignorance and arrogance about the desires of the Mexican polity.193 
Mexicans have long expressed concerns regarding the excessive power 
of police and prosecutors.194 Comparative legal studies have 
demonstrated that Mexicans have a high rate of distrust for the office of 
the prosecutor when compared with other nations.195 Notwithstanding 
these findings, the United States has funded the Mexican Attorney 
General’s office and has done so in the face of ongoing scandals related 
to corruption, bribery, and other crimes that have plagued the 
bureaucracy. In July 2011, some four years after the inception of the 
Mérida Initiative, 111 prosecutors were charged with bribery and 
corruption, abuse of power and “botched investigations,” causing the 
Attorney General’s resignation even while U.S. rule of law funds have 
bolstered the office.196 More recently, in September 2012, the Attorney 
General’s office has come under investigation for collaboration in the 
transport of drugs leading to the resignation of the top organized crime 
prosecutor.197 USAID rule of law funds have been allocated to police 
departments implicated in complicity with drug cartels and some of the 
worst human rights violations.198 All said, USAID and its contractors are 
implicated in the very system in which Mexicans have the least trust. 
 
 191 U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, supra note 81. 
 192 Johnson, supra note 78.  
 193 See supra Part III.A. 
 194 See Justice Reform Season Opens, CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07MEXICO4881 (Sept. 10, 2007, 
11:03 PM), http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php? id=07MEXICO4881&q=07mexico4881. 
 195 Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 82, at 65. 
 196 Assoc. Press, Mexican Prosecutors Face Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, at A6 (noting 
that over 100 prosecutors in the Attorney General’s office faced charges for crimes including 
abuse of power); Tony Nelson, News and Analysis March 21–April 3, 2011, MEXICO SOLIDARITY 
NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://mexicosolidarity.org/post/2011/april/
newsandanalysismarch21april32011; see also Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico: Woman Picked to Fight 
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A6 (noting the ineffectiveness of the Office of the 
Prosecutor). 
 197 Randal C. Archibold, Top Mob Prosecutor Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at A8; 
Mexico’s Federal Attorney General Investigates Its Own Air Fleet for Drug Trafficking, THE 
FULANO FILES (Sept. 8, 2012), http://fulano.info/wordpress/?p=1379. 
 198 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos 
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Nik Steinberg, Mexico 
Researcher for Human Rights Watch), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/
2012_5_10_Human_Rights_In_Mexico/Santiago_Aguirre_Testimony.pdf (noting that the U.S. 
is aiding in some of the worst human rights abuses); see Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Agencies 
Clash Publicly Over Shooting of C.I.A. Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, at A24 (reporting 
on charges that the federal police tried to kill U.S. CIA employees); Randal C. Archibold & Eric 
Schmitt, Americans Shot in Mexico Were C.I.A. Operatives in Fight Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
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Mérida’s emphasis on strengthening formal prosecutorial powers 
appears to be oblivious to the fact that the balance of power in the 
Mexican judiciary favors prosecutors.199 To further exacerbate the 
preponderance of prosecutorial power, the rule of law program has 
introduced the use of the plea bargain (juicio abreviado).200 As the office 
of the prosecutor has greater resources than the defendant, plea 
bargaining processes make it more likely that it will be easier to induce 
defendants to give up their rights and plead guilty.201 Indeed, the 
introduction of plea-bargaining has created additional fear among 
Mexicans that unethical prosecutors may coerce innocent persons into 
inculpating themselves.202 
The expansion of the powers of prosecutor’s office similarly 
undermines the desires of Mexicans to have greater lay presence and 
control of the criminal justice system.203 Comparative legal studies 
demonstrate that an overwhelming number of Mexicans—more so than 
other countries that were included in the studies—have faith in the 
abilities of their fellow citizens to sit as jurors and to make fair and just 
decisions in the criminal justice process through a jury system.204 
Mexican citizens are also ranked high in terms of willingness to serve as 
jurors, even after they were asked to evaluate the dangers associated 
with adjudicating a defendant with gang affiliations whose members 
might be present and observing courtroom processes.205 Moreover, the 
majority of Mexicans expressed the view that lay presence through the 
jury system would lessen crime in their communities.206 Nonetheless, 
notably absent from the Mérida Initiative is any proposal to reintroduce 
 
Aug. 29, 2012, at A4; Ginger Thompson et al., Hand of U.S. Is Seen in Halting General’s Rise, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1 (noting concerns that high ranking officials in the Mexican 
military were misusing U.S. funds and were involved with drug trafficking). 
 199 David A. Shirk & Alejandra Rios Cázares, Introduction: Reforming the Administration of 
Justice in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO 1, 19–20 (Wayne 
A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds., 2007) (noting that this is the case more so than elsewhere 
in the hemisphere); Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Criminal Investigation and the Subversion of 
the Principles of the Justice System in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
IN MEXICO 133, 134, 139–40; Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 313; Wright, supra note 49, at 
369–70 (characterizing Mexico as having a unique form of a civil law model due to the 
expansive role of the prosecutor). 
 200 MATT INGRAM & DAVID A. SHIRK, TRANS-BORDER INST., JUDICIAL REFORM IN MEXICO: 
TOWARD A NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (2010), available at http://catcher.sandiego.edu/
items/peacestudies/2010-IngraShirk-JRM%20%282%29.pdf. 
 201 Craig M. Bradley, Overview, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE A WORLDWIDE STUDY xv, xvii 
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 1999) (observing that prosecutors with weak cases against 
defendants are more likely to offer plea arrangements). 
 202 INGRAM & SHIRK, supra note 200, at 20. 
 203 See Fukurai et al., supra note 169, at 22 (noting willingness of Mexicans to participate in a 
jury system). 
 204 Id. at 3, 5 (noting that of the six nations that were part of a comparative study, including 
the United States, Mexico had the highest expression of confidence in the jury system). 
 205 Id. at 27. 
 206 Id. 
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jury trials, “a most effective means of inducting people into a culture of 
rights and responsibilities.”207 Nor is there any reference to training with 
regard to the jury system, despite calls for oral trials in Mexico.208 This 
omission, too, suggests indifference for context and conditions in 
Mexico and undermines those factors that serve as the foundation for 
improved outcomes in the criminal justice system. 
It is often difficult for Mexican authorities to resist U.S. pressures 
for legal reform, for the law project is part of an extensive network of 
conditionalities and quid pro quos, of trade-offs and reciprocities: 
Acquiescence on one issue obtains concessions on another.209 As one 
scholar has observed: “The fundamental asymmetry of the relationship 
between external and local actors, evident from the start both in who 
takes the initiative in judicial reform and who has the money (whether 
requested or not) affects all aspects of the reform process as it has 
unfolded in Latin America.”210 Such “passive acceptance,” however, 
“does not indicate a genuine commitment to reform or to a particular 
reform strategy.”211 Indeed, Mexican jurists and human rights groups 
have denounced these and other reforms that strengthen the hand of 
prosecutors, especially laws that authorize the holding of organized 
crime suspects for up to eighty days without charges.212 The president of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and former Mexican 
Federal Attorney General Sergio García Ramírez has decried search and 
seizure reforms advocated by the United States as attacks on protected 
rights.213 Other critics have charged that the reforms are 
unconstitutional, undermine traditional habeas corpus rights, and result 
in a two-tiered system of justice—one for “ordinary crime” and the 
other for individuals accused of organized crime.214 
 
 207 Bill Keller, A Jury of Whose Peers?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at A23 (describing the 
importance of the jury system according to Tocqueville); Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing In, 
But the Jury Pool is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14. 
 208 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 209 LUIS PÁSARA, LATIN AM. PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: WORTHWHILE OR 
WORTHLESS? 6–8 (2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Jutice%20
Reform%20in%20LATAM.pdf. 
 210 Id. at 8. 
 211 Id. at 7. 
 212 GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 147; Carlsen, supra note 89 (noting that Mexican judges from 
the Supreme Court to the lower courts have objected to U.S. reform initiatives); see supra note 
194 and accompanying text. 
 213 Jorge Carrasco Araizaga & Gloria Leticia Diaz, Judicial Reform Marked “Made in 
America,” PROCESO 1633, Feb. 17, 2008, at 2 (on file with author). U.S. initiated reforms 
included authorizing prosecutors to hold organized crime suspects for up to eighty days 
without charges. GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 147; Jorge Alonso, A Thousand and One 
Demonstrations: For Life, Petroleum and Rights, REVISTA ENVIO (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3750. 
 214 INGRAM & SHIRK, supra note 200, at 20; Carlsen, supra note 89; Laura Carlsen, On Eve of 
Summit, Mexico’s Human Rights Record Comes Under Fire in U.S. Congress, AMERICAS 
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The same criticisms were lodged by both the members of the 
Mexican congress and a human rights group, Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez 
Center.215 Activists have condemned the replication of U.S. counter-
terrorism style reforms and have warned that the Mérida Initiative will 
result in violations of the rights of Mexican union leaders and 
migrants.216 Their warnings have not remained in the realm of the 
speculative: Soldiers unlawfully broke into the homes of at least a dozen 
homes in one community in the state of Jalisco on authority claimed as 
part of the fight against drug trafficking.217 
The Mérida Initiative’s pronouncements about protecting the 
rights of Mexicans have been criticized as “a grotesque and absurd 
pretension.”218 The Archdioceses of Mexico City denounced the plan, 
urged its rejection, and called it “offensive charity.”219 Still others suggest 
that the reforms amount to nothing more than window dressing and 
observe that confessions obtained through torture remain admissible in 
courts of law.220 Scholars who have surveyed the result of legal reforms 
have found little change and few incentives for prosecutors to abandon 
abusive practices.221 They also note that changes are not likely to 
materialize without local political, economic, and social commitment.222 
Despite these critiques, U.S. officials and their contractors have 
continued with their efforts. They have attempted to deflect the 
criticisms, insisting that proposed reforms create efficiency and have 
 
PROGRAM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1801; see Navarro, supra note 
50. 
 215 Victor Ballinas, CNDH: La Reforma Judicial de Felipe Calderón, Revés a Derechos 
Humanos, LA JORNADA (Mexico City, Mex.), Sept. 28, 2007, available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/09/28/index.php?section=politica&article=012n1pol 
(noting criticisms by the president of the CNDH that the reforms were a grave setback to 
fundamental human rights); Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social AC, Reforma Judicial, 
Lesiva de los Derechos Humanos, CENCOS (Feb. 25, 2008); see Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213, 
at 3 (noting a number of groups expressing concerns for the new warrantless search laws); 
Carlsen, supra note 214 (reviewing concerns of Senator Ramón Galindo and other supporters 
of President Calderón); see also Elisabeth Malkin & Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Withholds 
Millions in Mexico Antidrug Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at A7 (noting that the Mexican 
government called the U.S. State Department’s call for Mexican legislation to strengthen its 
human rights commission an affront to its sovereignty). 
 216 Carlsen, supra note 89; Carlsen, supra note 214; Navarro, supra note 50. 
 217 Vania Citlalli de Dios & Rebeca Herrejón, Denuncian Abusos de Ejército, MURAL 
(Guadalajara, Mex.), Dec. 10. 2009, at 2. 
 218 Marc Lacey, Congress Trims Bush’s Mexico Drug Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A6 
(quoting from an editorial in the Mexican newspaper, La Jornada) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 219 GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220 Id. at 146–47 (noting that some reforms would not take full effect until 2016 during 
which time torture-coerced confessions will be allowed into evidence); Paco Rodriguez, Justicia 
Colonizada, NOTICIAS (Oaxaca, Mex.) (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.noticiasnet.mx/portal/
principal/justicia-colonizada (noting that in some states, the judicial system is in a state of 
collapse because of efforts to implement the USAID reforms). 
 221 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 313. 
 222 Id. at 315. 
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readily pressed the Mexican legislature for their passage.223 The efforts 
to give more power and authority to an office in which the vast majority 
of Mexican citizens lack confidence will deny the Mérida Initiative the 
support and acceptance given to those developed from within 
communities affected by crime and impunity.224 
2.     Mexican Reforms: Law, Order, and New Governance Strategies 
The Mérida Initiative has ignored capacity of Mexican lawyers and 
citizens to develop their own “[l]egal nationalism.”225 Mexico is situated 
in a region where legal systems are undergoing rapid transformations. 
Countries throughout the hemisphere chose to appropriate from one 
another, often in an attempt to harmonize each other’s laws.226 More 
particularly, and motivated by the challenges of addressing the complex 
determinants of crime and the threat to social coherence as a 
consequence of a drug-related violence and related economic 
dislocation, communities throughout Mexico have developed methods 
of new governance to address law and order concerns.227 In these places, 
populist reforms have supplanted traditional legal responses that have 
failed to address the rising violence. Social groups engaging in bottom-
up lawmaking have “become practical lawmakers, accountable to each 
other for their choices.”228 
 
 223 See TAFOYA, supra note 75, at 9–10 (noting USAID/Proderecho’s lobbying assistance 
with Mexican legislators); Justice Reform Season Opens, supra note 194; Strengthening Justice 
Systems in Mexico, supra note 75 (noting lobbying efforts throughout). 
 224 A close analysis of the motivation of the Mexican Attorney General’s office in receiving 
USAID funding and support is beyond the scope of this Article, except to point to the 
reasoning of Bryant Garth who noted that political elites who enter into these types of import-
export arrangements often do so to enhance their own power. Garth, supra note 104, at 30. 
 225 López-Alyllón & Fix-Fierro, supra note 152, at 294; see Lau, supra note 7 (arguing 
relatedly that a focus on westernization as the impetus for legal change denies the domestic 
forces that bring about change). 
 226 Huneeus et al., supra note 148, at 7 (“Latin America is a region of multiple legal orders 
that overlap and coexist.”); Esquirol, supra note 7, at 1035; Langer, supra note 108, at 618–19 
(describing the mushrooming of criminal codes as part of a regional phenomenon).  
 227 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EU AND THE US 1, 2 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (defining new governance as 
“a shift away from the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either the 
involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or indeed the absence of any 
traditional framework of government”). 
 228 Charles F. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism of Firms 
and Public Institutions (paper presented to the Conference on Liberal Institutions, Economic 
Constitutional Rights, and the Role of Organizations, European Univ. Inst., Dec. 15–16, 1995), 
in LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 101 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 1997), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html; see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance 
Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357, 
379 (describing a new governance view of bottom-up lawmaking as “self-reflexive, transparent, 
and dialogically reasoned”). 
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In the state of Chiapas, autonomous indigenous communities 
together with the Zapatistas have developed legal structures to address 
public health issues, mediate conflict, confront crime, and engage 
human rights concerns.229 Operating under a system of Good 
Governance Councils (Juntas de Buen Gobierno), they have taken a 
novel approach to crime based on community governance and 
consensus that includes “forgiveness and goodness,” which, for example, 
require a murderer to support a victim’s widow in an effort to avoid 
creating “two widows.”230 Relying on strategies that seek to address the 
determinants of crime and conflict, the Zapatista Good Government 
Councils have achieved a reduction in crime and impunity, precisely the 
stated goal of the Mérida Initiative.231 
Similarly, three municipalities in the state of Guerrero have 
developed a justice system, in response to an increase in violence, which 
later expanded into a regional justice system.232 The Guerrero regional 
justice system combines indigenous laws with Mexico’s statutory laws as 
well as newly developed legal norms, some of which are based on 
international human rights principles. 233 Much of it rests on principles 
of restorative justice.234 Criminality in Guerrero is reported to have been 
reduced by ninety-two percent.235 
 
 229 Schacherreiter, supra note 153, at 27, 34 (describing various autonomous law-related 
structures as part of the Zapatista Juntas of Good Government); see Karina Ansolabehere, More 
Power, More Rights? The Supreme Court and Society in Mexico, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY, 
supra note 148, at 78, 99 (noting the constitutionalization of indigenous rights was a function of 
the Zapatista movement). 
 230 Andrew Woolford & R.S. Ratner, Disrupting the Informal–Formal Justice Complex: On 
the Transformative Potential of Civil Mediation, Restorative Justice and Reparations Politics, 13 
CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 5, 14 (2010) (describing the commutation of a life sentence of an army 
General who had kidnaped, raped, and tortured indigenous residents of Chiapas); see Paul 
Clark, Restorative Justice and ADR: Opportunities and Challenges, 44 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 13 
(2001). 
 231 Jorge Alonso, The President and the EZLN Issue Their Reports, REVISTA ENVÍO 
(Managua, Nicar.) (Oct. 2004), http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2682; Fred Rosen, Interview 
with Javier Sicilia Part II: Reweaving Mexico’s Social Fabric, NACLA (N.Y.C., N.Y.) (Feb. 14, 
2012), https://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/14/interview-javier-sicilia-part-ii-reweaving-mexico%E2
%80%99s-social-fabric (observing that in the Zapatista areas, there is almost no crime because 
of the focus on strengthening the social fabric). 
 232 María Teresa Sierra, Indigenous Justice Faces the State: The Community Police Force in 
Guerrero Mexico, NACLA REP. AM., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 34. The civilian monitoring system in 
Guerrero was created because the official actors in the criminal justice system were found to be 
corrupt and responsible for many human rights violations suffered by the people in the region. 
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57. 
 233 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35; see also Ann Gurucharri & Anthony Saudek, Mexican 
Justice, 8 HARV. KENNEDY SCH. REV. 83, 89 (2008). 
 234 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35 (noting, for example, that the Guerrero regional criminal 
justice system seeks to re-educate and rehabilitate defendants and to return them to their 
communities); see also Gurucharri & Saudek, supra note 233. 
 235 Maria Teresa Sierra, The Revival of Indigenous Justice in Mexico: Challenges for Human 
Rights and the State, 28 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 52, 58 (2005). 
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In the state of Puebla, mechanisms for dispensing “indigenous 
justice” have emerged as a result of the activism of local residents and 
human rights groups who select their own judges and oversee local 
courts.236 These newly developed courts have significantly altered the 
ways in which crime and violence are addressed. As one scholar has 
observed, local courts are designed to “respect[] the human rights of 
people who are arrested. They do not want to reproduce people’s usual 
experiences with state justice based on corruption and impunity.”237 
These courts have also fostered the growth of women’s leadership and 
greater attention to gender concerns in matters of justice.238 Similarly, 
the Cherán Indian community in Michoacán, determined to develop its 
own legal structures, expelled the police force, and patrols its 
neighborhoods while eschewing any effort to militarize the region.239 
These new governance judicial mechanisms are being promoted in 
other localities throughout Mexico.240 
Other initiatives provide examples of efforts by Mexican activists to 
expand and defend their rights, reduce violence, and demand an end to 
impunity.241 Civic organizations and nonprofit groups have created 
networks and coalitions through which they gain rights in a broad 
spectrum of concerns, including citizen security, police corruption, 
labor, trade-related issues, voting rights, housing, and environmental 
matters.242 “Superbarrio” Gómez, a folk hero hailed by scholars of 
Mexico, serves as the spokesperson for the Asamblea de Barrios 
(Assembly of Neighborhoods), and advocates for the poor in various 
legal disputes.243 
While recognizing that there is danger in overstating the 
achievements of non-state efforts in Mexico, new governance initiatives 
and popular reforms have garnered the support of the residents in the 
communities in which they are taking place. They function in 
contentious relationship to existing formal laws and create the 
possibility of transforming Mexico’s response to crime, drug cartels, and 
violence.244 These new governance strategies tack in the opposite 
 
 236 Id. at 55–58. 
 237 Id. at 60–61. 
 238 Id. at 61–62. 
 239 Indigenous Communities Rise Up Against Crime, AMERICA, Aug. 15, 2011, at 6–7, 
available at http://americamagazine.org/issue/784/signs/indigenous-community-rises-against-
crime; Krauze, supra note 35, at 69. 
 240 Sierra, supra note 232, at 13. 
 241 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 49, 66. 
 242 Id. at 49–50; Diane E. Davis, From Democracy to Rule of Law? Police Impunity in 
Contemporary Latin America, REVISTA: HARV. REV. LATIN AM., Fall 2002, at 21, 23. 
 243 THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 252 (2001). 
 244 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 547–48 (2007) 
(describing the ways new governance may act as rival to and/or transform existing legal 
regulation). 
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direction of the Mérida Initiative rule of law program, which focuses on 
enhancing traditional criminal justice processes of prosecution and 
punishment. 
3.     Mexican Reforms: Law, Order, and International Human Rights 
Perspectives 
Many of the reform efforts proposed by Mexican legal and human 
rights activists seek to incorporate international human rights concepts 
to protect citizens against crime and impunity in lieu of the Mérida-style 
emphasis on criminal enforcement.245 A coalition of nongovernmental 
organizations and academics have proposed constitutional reforms to 
enhance human rights protections including those found in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as 
well as immigrant and refugee protections.246 They have advocated the 
explicit protection of rights that may not be suspended under any 
circumstances.247 These proposals, moreover, seek to direct attention to 
the impact of global economics on socio-economic rights in addition to 
civil and political rights as a means of addressing the determinants of 
crime and insecurity.248 They reflect the belief, as expressed by Javier 
Sicilia, the leader of Mexico’s Movement for Peace with Justice and 
Dignity, that the critical legal reforms required to address drug-related 
violence would, of necessity, address the paradigmatic neoliberal 
economic developments that he describes as constituting “the legal form 
of criminality.”249 
Other community groups have organized to implement human 
rights treaties to assist victims of torture, wrongful arrests, and those 
crimes where no relief could be found in the Mexican criminal justice 
system.250 For example, in Ciudad Juárez, where the numbers of women 
murdered has soared, families of victims in collaboration with local 
grassroots organizations invoked the Istanbul Protocol, which governs 
the processes for the documentation of torture, and thereby forced the 
Mexican government to allow outside forensic experts to investigate the 
 
 245 Laura Carlsen, Mexico’s False Dilemma: Human Rights or Security, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 146, 151–52 (2012). 
 246 Press Release, Instituto Mexicano de Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Organizaciones 
de la Sociedad Civil y Miembros de la Academia Exhortan a la Cámara de Diputados a Aprobar 
la Reforma Constitucional en Materia de Derechos Humanos (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://imdhd.org/boletines_detalle.php?id=9976. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Carlsen, supra note 245. 
 249 Rosen, supra note 231. 
 250 Marc Lacey, Human Rights Defenders Seek Protection in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2010, at A14. 
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murders of their loved ones.251 They succeeded in implementing 
international standards in order to obtain an independent investigation 
by an entity of their own choosing—the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team—notwithstanding the Mexican government’s 
initial refusal to allow them into the country.252 Murdered victims’ 
families similarly invoked the very same protocol to investigate the 
torture of those accused of having committed the crimes.253 
These campaigns reflect Mexican efforts to respond to the 
challenges of crime and impunity while insisting upon fairness and 
justice for the accused. Social movement activists have employed the 
framework of international human rights norms in support of their calls 
to modify laws that have been promoted by the U.S. rule of law 
program.254 Indeed, legal activism in the name of human rights has 
gained popular support, particularly those that seek to develop collective 
social benefits as opposed to notions of individualism based on liberal 
thought.255 As a means of defending alternative forms of seeking justice, 
civil society groups have emerged calling for the protection of human 
rights defenders.256 In fact, the recent focus on a human rights 
framework has been described as one of the most important reforms, 
having “the potential to considerably expand access to justice for 
ordinary people.”257 These developments suggest that the capacity for 
developing a “culture of legality” is well developed within Mexico.258 
4.     Mexican/Regional Reforms: Rethinking the War on Drugs 
Perhaps the most significant reforms at odds with the Mérida rule 
of law program relate to the very heart of the U.S. approach to drug 
trafficking and drug violence, that is, the “war on drugs.” As noted 
above, the Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program calls for an expanded 
 
 251 See Weissman, supra note 4, at 415–17. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 417–19. 
 254 Enrique Krauze, Can This Poet Save Mexico?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at SR6. 
 255 See Analiese M. Richard, Mediating Dilemmas: Local NGOs and Rural Development in 
Neoliberal Mexico, 32 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 166 (2009); Alberto Morales, 
Excelente y Buena, Atención en CNDH: Encuesta, EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico City, Mex.) (Dec. 26, 
2009), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/648081.html (noting a 2009 survey demonstrating 
that Mexicans readily make use of the National Commission on Human Rights for reporting 
human rights abuses). 
 256 See ASOCIACIÓN POLÍTICA NACIONAL PROPUESTA CIVICA, AYUDÁNOS A SALVAR LAS 
VIDAS DE LOS LUCHADORES POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, available at 
http://www.propuestacivica.org.mx/derechos-humanos.html. 
 257 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 317–18. 
 258 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35 (noting that due to the strength of community support, the 
alternative system has gained de facto recognition from the state). 
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criminalized response to drug-related crime.259 Many Mexicans, 
however, have rejected this approach as having failed to end the drug-
related violence.260 Mexican human rights activists have expressed 
strong support for the consideration of decriminalization strategies as a 
means to address the crisis in Mexico. They have made the link between 
drug prohibition and human rights violations and urged the “rethinking 
the criminalization of drug use would be a very important long-term 
strategy to improving the serious human-rights situation that Mexico is 
facing today.”261 Mexican grassroots movements against the 
militarization of the drug war have also called for a legalization 
approach.262 Public opinion surveys have indicated that Mexicans reject 
U.S. crime and imprisonment requirements as useless dogma, and 
further, Mexicans believe that U.S. strategies have exacerbated their 
problems.263 Public discourses call for solutions more consistent with 
Mexican history and culture.264 
These popular sentiments are reflected within findings issued in a 
report by the 2009 Latin American Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy (the Commission), headed by Ernesto Zedillo, the former 
president of Mexico, and the former presidents of Brazil and 
Colombia—all countries with a history of problems with drug cartels.265 
The report calls for a new paradigm to address drug-related problems.266 
More specifically, it calls for an end to the U.S. model of war on drugs 
policies and punitive drug laws after concluding that such strategies 
have done little to diminish drug-related crime or improve public health 
outcomes.267 The report emphasizes public health and social policy 
strategies instead of reliance on harsh criminal penalties, and garnered 
significant popular support.268 
 
 259 See supra Part I.C. 
 260 Maria de las Heras, 63%: “La Vía Policial y Militar Contra el Narco, un Fracaso en 
América Latina,” MILENIO (Mexico City, Mex.) (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.milenio.com/cdb/
doc/impreso/8533187. 
 261 Christoper Moraff, Latin America’s Legalization Push, AM. PROSPECT, June 2009, 
available at http://prospect.org/article/latin-americas-legalization-push (quoting a Mexico 
City-based human-rights activist and political consultant) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 262 Randal C. Archibold, Violence Suffocated a Father’s Poetry, But Not His Voice, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2011, at A6; Elisabeth Malkin, Thousands in Mexico City March Against Drug 
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A8. 
 263 de las Heras, supra note 260. 
 264 Id. 
 265 LATIN AM. COMM’N ON DRUGS & DEMOCRACY, DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A 
PARADIGM SHIFT (2009), available at http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_
ingles_site.pdf [hereinafter LATIN AM. COMM’N]; see EDWARDS & YOUNGERS, supra note 110, at 
1 (also observing changes to Argentina’s criminal laws relating to drug possession). 
 266 LATIN AM. COMM’N, supra note 265. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id.  
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The Latin American Commission was followed by the formation of 
a Global Commission on Drug Policy, which also included notable 
Mexican politicians and scholars.269 It issued similar findings that 
criticized U.S. drug policies for failing to resolve drug violence while 
noting the horrific consequences of U.S. strategies.270 The report 
identified Mexico as an example of drug law enforcement practices that 
served to increase the violence and corruption associated with the drug 
trade: 
The available scientific evidence suggests that increasing the intensity 
of law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely 
to reduce drug gang violence. Instead, the existing evidence suggests 
that drug-related violence and high homicide rates are likely a 
natural consequence of drug prohibition and that increasingly 
sophisticated and well-resourced methods of disrupting drug 
distribution networks may unintentionally increase violence.271 
And in May 2013, the Organization of American States released its 
comprehensive report on drug polices, “express[ing] their frustration 
with the limits and exorbitant costs of current policies and their hunger 
for a fuller, more creative debate.”272 
Ernesto Zedillo has called for an end to the “war on drugs model” 
describing such an approach as “nothing short of devastating.”273 The 
former president of Colombia, César Gaviria, who held office during the 
worst of that country’s drug wars, called U.S. war on drugs and its drug 
polices a “crashing failure [fracaso].”274 Costa Rica’s president Laura 
Chinchilla stated: 
because we have no army and we are not willing to be hooked onto 
that convoy of destruction, of militarism, of exorbitant expenditure, 
that distracts states from their efforts toward social 
investment . . . . Costa Rica has already made progress in 
decriminalizing drug consumption, [because] we believe it’s a 
question of public health, and not of criminal law.275 
 
 269 See GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POL’Y, supra note 73. 
 270 Id. at 9. 
 271 Id. at 15 (quoting INT’L CENTRE FOR SCI. DRUG POL’Y, EFFECT OF DRUG LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ON DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A SCIENTIFIC REVIEW 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.icsdp.org/Libraries/doc1/ICSDP-1_-_FINAL_1.sflb.ashx) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 272 Randal C. Archibold, Americas Coalition Suggests Marijuana Laws Be Relaxed, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2013, at A7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 273 Ernesto Zedillo, Rethinking the ‘War on Drugs’: Insights from the US and Mexico, VOX 
(London) (May 22, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/rethinking-war-drugs-insights-us-and-
mexico. 
 274 Alma Guillermoprieto, Drugs: The Rebellion in Cartagena, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 2012, 
at 39 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 275 Id. at 40 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The government of Uruguay recently announced that it was not 
only considering regulating and decriminalizing marijuana as part of its 
own security plan but also creating a legal state-managed monopoly for 
the transport of drugs as part of what has been described as “a rising 
movement in this region to create alternatives to the United States-led 
war on drugs.”276 A Brazilian congressman stated plainly: “[w]e are 
trying to distance ourselves from the U.S. model.”277 Bolivia successfully 
demanded amendments to the UN Antidrug Convention because of its 
prohibition on the use of the coca plant notwithstanding U.S. objections 
to the change.278 These national leaders have not only expressed 
opposition to the U.S. criminalization-style response to drug trafficking, 
but some have suggested that they are owed compensation for the 
tremendous amount of resources required to invest in such a 
response.279 
Notwithstanding the emergence of popular sentiment in favor of 
an end to the prototype war on drugs criminalization strategies, the 
United States has persisted with its own version of law and order 
reforms.280 U.S. drug law policies have insinuated themselves over the 
border by way of trade conditionalities imposed on Mexico that require 
it to certify its drug control efforts according to terms defined by the 
United States.281 U.S. officials continue to pressure Mexican and other 
Latin American leaders who have proposed an ordered scheme of 
 
 276 Damien Cave, South America Sees Drug Path to Legalization, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, 
at A1. 
 277 Damien Cave, Ask a Question on Drug Policy in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2012, 10:24 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/damien-cave-is-taking-
questions-on-drug-policy-in-latin-america/?ref=world (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 278 William Neuman, Bolivia: Morales Wins Victory as U.N. Agrees to Define Some Coca Use 
as Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at A7 (noting that Bolivia, which had withdrawn from the 
Convention in protest, rejoined after an agreement that allows Bolivians to use the leaves as a 
mild stimulant and in various cultural rituals). 
 279 Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 40. 
 280 LUIS ASTORGA, DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO: A FIRST GENERAL ASSESSMENT 20 
(Mgmt. of Soc. Transformations, Disc. Paper No. 36, 1999), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117644Eo.pdf (noting that “[t]he only political 
force the Mexican government has ever listened to, in drug matters, is the U.S.A. government”); 
Wright, supra note 49, at 368; Boscov-Ellen, supra note 49; Garcia, supra note 44 (noting that 
the United States has set the agenda for Mexico’s drug policy); see Oscar Avila, Mexico Weighs 
a Change of Focus on Drugs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2008, at 7 (noting pressure from the United 
States on then President Vicente Fox in 2006 while he was considering a proposal to 
decriminalize small amounts of drug possession). 
 281 Jan Rus & Miguel Tinker Salas, Introduction: Mexico 2006-2012: High Stakes, Daunting 
Challenges, 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 5, 14 (2006). But, note that the United States tolerated 
Mexico’s drug activity and certified Mexico’s efforts through the 1980s and 1990s for strategic 
reasons relating to the need to pass NAFTA. See JORGE HERNÁNDEZ TINAJERO & LEOPOLDO 
RIVERA RIVERA, INT’L DRUG POL’Y CONSORTIUM, CANNABIS IN MEXICO, AN OPEN DEBATE 
(2010), available at http://idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Cannabis%20in%20Mexico.pdf; 
JOSE LUIS VELASCO, INSURGENCY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO’S 
“DEMOCRATIZATION” 102–03 (2005). 
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legalization of drugs to abandon such pursuits.282 The United States 
rejected plans to debate an alternative to criminalization strategies at the 
2012 Summit of the Americas and issued an “official response” signaling 
that any effort to decriminalize drugs was “unthinkable.”283 President 
Obama is reported to have “flatly ruled out legalizing drugs” in response 
to the debate about the Commission’s recommendations despite the 
forceful and open positions articulated by Latin American leaders, and 
their unprecedented willingness to confront the United States on its 
failed criminalization policies.284 Surveys on the issue suggest that most 
interviewees believed that the United States has attempted to prevent 
Mexicans from fully debating the subject.285 
U.S. efforts to diminish the influence of these reports 
notwithstanding, proposals to end the U.S.-style war on drugs continue 
to gain ground in Mexico and throughout much of Latin America. 
Mexicans are rethinking the legal strategies based on criminalization of 
drug use, drug possession, and drug transport. They, with their Latin 
American counterparts, have declared that “[t]he foundations of the 
U.S.-led war on drugs—eradication of production, interdiction of 
traffic, and criminalization of consumption—have not succeeded and 
never will.”286 Surveys demonstrate that Mexican citizens strongly desire 
 
 282 Shortly after the release of the Commission’s report, the Mexican Congress enacted 
modest legal reforms that legalized the possession of certain drugs in small quantities. Wright, 
supra note 49, at 368. President Calderón called for a national debate on the issue of 
legalization, but subsequently curtailed his willingness to move forward with such agenda—a 
reluctance widely understood as a function of his concern that the United States disapproves of 
such a shift. Juan Carlos Hidalgo, Calderón Hints at Drug Legalization Again, CATO INST. 
(Sept. 20, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/calderon-hints-at-drug-legalization-
again/; Tim Johnson, In Mexico, Biden Shoots Down Talk of Drug Legalization, MCCLATCHYDC 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/05/140884/in-central-america-biden-
shoots.html; see Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Remains Opposed to Drug Legalization, Biden Tells 
Region, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A6 (describing Vice President Biden as issuing a blunt 
message); Cave, supra note 44; Garcia, supra note 44 (noting that a move toward legalization 
would be an affront to U.S. policy makers that neither Calderón nor his successor, Enrique 
Peña Nieto, could afford to make); Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 39; Moraff, supra note 
261; Mark Stevenson, Amid U.S. Pressure, Mexican President Backs Off Drug Decriminalization 
Bill, POLICEONE (May 4, 2006), http://www.policeone.com/drug-interdiction-narcotics/articles/
132451-Amid-U-S-pressure-Mexican-president-backs-off-drug-decriminalization-bill. 
 283 Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 39 (noting that meetings were called in advance of 
the Summit and that statements in strong terms were issued by Secretary of Homeland Security 
Janet Napolitano, Vice President Joseph Biden, and President Obama). 
 284 Matea Gold, Obama Says No to Legalizing Drugs: Leaders at the Summit of the Americas 
Want to Discuss What They Consider a Failed War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at 6; Garcia, 
supra note 44; see, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, End the War on Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at 
A33. The literature of the war on drugs in the United States is not reviewed in this Article. 
 285 de las Heras, supra note 260. 
 286 César Gaviria, Fernando Henrique Cardoso & Ernesto Zedillo, Drugs: The Debate Goes 
Mainstream, LATIN AM. BUREAU (May 10, 2012), http://www.lab.org.uk/index.php? option=
com_content&view=article&id=1371:drugs-the-debate-goesmainstream&catid=66: analysis& 
Itemid=39; see Randal C. Archibold, Mexico Closely Watches California’s Vote on Legalizing 
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at A6. 
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to be more closely involved in the decisions for their country with 
regard to changes to its legal system.287 They have begun to rethink 
alternatives that differ from the prototypical U.S. response that 
emphasizes punishment and reconsider responses to drug-related 
violence.288 
5.     Rule of Law Programs and Sovereignty 
While much of the Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program conflicts 
with reform efforts initiated by Mexicans themselves, there are some 
program provisions that have been promoted by Mexican legal 
reformers independent of the U.S. funded project.289 Indeed, in the past 
twenty years, a number of Mexican efforts to improve its legal system 
have been comparable to the U.S. rule of law model.290 Yet even where 
there may be concurrence on the substance of particular reforms, many 
Mexicans have objected to the Mérida rule of law program.291 As an 
initiative driven by U.S. foreign policy considerations, the rule of law 
program threatens to subordinate Mexico’s development of internal 
legal norms and structures and thus compromises Mexican sovereignty. 
The Mérida Initiative follows an established practice: law reform 
efforts that originate from outside the countries where legal changes are 
sought.292 Substantive reforms were directed and coordinated through 
an MSI-created entity in Mexico known as Proderecho, whose director 
had previously led one of the largest U.S. public relations and lobbying 
firms to promote support for NAFTA.293 USAID has also partnered with 
 
 287 Catalina Pérez Correa, Distrust and Disobedience: Discourse and Practice of Law in 
México, 77 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 345, 361 (2008). 
 288 LATIN AM. COMM’N, supra note 265.  
 289 Langer, supra note 108, at 618. 
 290 Javier Couso, The Transformation of Constitutional Discourse and the Judicialization of 
Politics in Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY, supra note 148, at 141–42 (noting this is 
true for much of Latin America); see Kossick, supra note 158, at 725–27, 778. It should be 
noted, however, that many of these reforms were undertaken in large part as a result of pressure 
from international financial institutions upon which Mexico has been dependent and the 
globalized “free market” economy. Id. at 725–26. 
 291 INGRAM ET AL., supra note 54, at 12 (noting skepticism about judicial reform as a product 
of outside forces, especially the United States); see also COLLEEN W. COOK ET AL., CONG. RES. 
SERV., MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: PROPOSED U.S. ANTICRIME AND COUNTERDRUG ASSISTANCE FOR 
MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 6 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/103694.pdf. 
 292 BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION, AND MEXICAN 
MIGRATION 56 (2010); PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 7.  
 293 Rodriguez, supra note 220 (describing Proderecho as a USAID funded, MSI-operated 
organization); see MATTHEW C. INGRAM ET AL., TRANS-BORDER INST., JUSTICIABARÓMETRO: 
SURVEY OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN NINE MEXICAN STATES 2011, at 
99 (2011), available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/justiciabarometro-
judicial-survey.pdf (noting that Proderecho was created and funded by USAID and then 
contracted out to MSI); TAFOYA, supra note 75, at 1 n.1 (noting that Proderecho is the name 
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the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based entity comprised of U.S. 
politicians and political figures, in its endeavor to change Mexico’s legal 
system.294 Casals & Associates, a subsidiary of DynCorp, a Virginia-
based entity has lobbied Mexican legislators for constitutional 
amendments.295 
Mexican legal professionals, human rights activists, and the media 
have protested the USAID’s rule of law program as “made in 
America.”296 In a letter to the U.S. State Department, human rights 
organizations admonished the United States for having failed to 
establish any meaningful opportunity for citizen participation.297 They 
have criticized USAID’s “Mechanism for Dialogue with Civil Society 
Organizations” as a meaningless structure that provides little 
opportunity for citizens to contribute to reform initiatives or to evaluate 
outcomes.298 Jurists have complained that the U.S.-initiated reforms 
were enacted in a top-down manner without sufficient debate.299 Local 
officials decried the lack of Mérida’s benefits and castigated U.S. efforts 
for proposing reforms without a sufficient understanding of the 
circumstances.300 Concern for national sovereignty has driven much of 
the criticism of U.S efforts to impose legal reform in Mexico.301 
 
that the USAID’s Rule of Law project has used since 2004); Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213, at 
2 (describing Lucy Tacher who formerly worked for Burson Marsteller, as “one of the world’s 
leading lobbying firms”); Matthew C. Ingram, Trans-Border Inst., State-Level Judicial Reform in 
Mexico: The Local Progress of Criminal Justice Reforms (Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://catcher.sandiego.edu/items/peacestudies/Ingram-State%20Level%20Reform.pdf. 
 294 MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., supra note 74, at 13; see NDI Board of Directors, NAT’L 
DEMOCRATIC INST., http://www.ndi.org/board_of_directors (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 295 MGMT. SYS. INT’L, supra note 74, at 36–37. 
 296 Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213, at 2–3. 
 297 Conditioned Funds for Mexico Under the Mérida Initiative Should Not Be Released Unless 
Concrete Progress Is Made on Human Rights Requirements, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM. (May 
26, 2010), http://www.wola.org/news/conditioned_funds_for_mexico_under_the_merida_
initiative_should_not_be_released_unless_concrete [hereinafter Conditioned Funds]; see 
Ginger Thompson & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at A1. 
 298 Conditioned Funds, supra note 297. 
 299 Reforma Judicial Con Sello Gringo, PROCESO (Mexico City, Mex.) (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=196798; Patrick Corcoran, Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy on 
Corrupt Judges, INSIGHTCRIME (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/mexico-judicial-reforms-go-easy-on-corrupt-judges. 
 300 Joseph Kolb, Ciudad Juarez Mayor Says US Drug War Aid Package Failed His City, FOX 
NEWS LATINO (May 24, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/05/24/ciudad-
juarez-mayor-says-us-drug-war-aid-package-failed-his-city. 
 301 Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Has a New Attitude on U.S.: Obama Will Visit a Nation Said to 
Have Grown Far More Wary of American Involvement in its Security Affairs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2013, at 1 (noting a new wariness on the part of the Mexican government toward U.S. 
involvement in Mexico’s security affairs). 
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IV.     LAWYERS AS TECHNICIANS, LAW AS TECHNICALITIES 
As Thomas Carothers has observed, “[t]he rapidly growing field of 
rule-of-law assistance is operating from a disturbingly thin base of 
knowledge at every level.”302 USAID and affiliate private contractors 
who function as something of a “[r]ule of [l]aw industry” to effect 
reforms do so with little regard to past or present except as it infringes 
on American needs.303 “[W]e don’t really know what we are doing,” rule 
of law promoters have admitted.304 Law reform programs generally do 
not deviate from a predetermined template driven by what one USAID 
Fellow called “extraneous or counterproductive criteria.”305 Mistakes are 
repeated and recycled from one project to another, from one country to 
another.306 USAID contractors boast of numerous contracts with 
USAID on rule of law projects throughout the world. 307 Their one-size-
fits all model “provides a . . . system of widely accepted rules” and “a 
scheme of ordered liberty.”308 USAID and its contractors 
tend to go into the field with a preset number of “deliverables.” 
Rather than study the problems in the context of the culture, the 
assistance experts arrive with a formula that they are expected to 
implement and then are expected to write reports showing that the 
deliverables were achieved regardless of whether those 
accomplishments furthered the objectives of helping individuals.309 
 
 302 Carothers, supra note 1, at 13 
 303 Mackenzie, supra note 136 (internal quotation marks omitted); see PÁSARA, supra note 
209, at 1; Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2008, 
at 12.  
 304 Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, supra note 303 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 305 LINN HAMMERGREN, USAID GLOBAL CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, FIFTEEN 
YEARS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: WHERE WE ARE AND WHY WE HAVEN’T MADE 
MORE PROGRESS 14 (2002), available at ftp://pogar.org/LocalUser/pogarp/judiciary/linn2/
latin.pdf; see KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE PROFESSIONALS’ CRITIQUES, 
A COMMENTARY ON PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 4 
(2006), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/494.pdf (noting that programs are 
offered on a take it or leave it basis with little training value); Moliterno, supra note 80, at 770 
(describing the negative outcomes from exporting rules of ethics that assume the U.S. approach 
fits all). 
 306 HAMMERGREN, supra note 305. 
 307 TETRA TECH DPT, NAVIGATING CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 2, 8 (2011), available at 
http://www.tetratechdpk.com/images/stories/Tetra_Tech_DPK_Firm_Capabilities_March_201
1.pdf. DPK is now a division of Tetra Tech ARD and was one of USAID’s top ten contractors in 
2008. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, Contracts from U.S. Agency for International 
Development (FY 2008), FEDSPENDING.ORG, http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?sortp=
r&maj_agency_cat=72&detail=-1&datype=T&reptype=r&database=fpds&fiscal_year=2008&
submit=GO&sum_expand=PAS (last updated July 17, 2012). 
 308 TETRA TECH DPT, supra note 307, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 309 DAVIDSON, supra note 305, at 5. 
WEISSMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:31 PM 
1518 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1471 
 
The Mérida initiative project replicates the dominant model. It 
attempts to dissociate law from social and historical context, and instead 
markets technical and formalistic assistance in accordance with its “rule 
of law orthodoxy.”310 MSI boasts of projects throughout the globe and 
describes training templates that offer the same set of skills without 
regard to place or purpose.311 Checchi Consulting, an MSI 
subcontractor on the Mexico rule of law project, similarly advertises a 
formulaic global training program for judges and lawyers that appear 
oblivious to the possibilities that differences may exist between 
Afghanistan and Mexico.312 
An examination of the Mérida Initiative rule of law project sets in 
relief the approach of law-as-technicalities. USAID reports set forth 
conclusions without evidence, listing the number of individuals trained, 
the number of meetings held, name courses and events, and identify 
justice reforms without indicating the substance or outcomes of these 
activities.313 Charts lack context and substance; photographs of 
professionals at meetings fill the pages of quarterly reports.314 USAID 
proclaims the success of its rule of law project based on numbers of 
training events and declares, “[t]he number of events reported above 
enumerates the work of USAID/Mexico . . . and demonstrate the 
successes of the project in its different phases of moving toward 
criminal justice reform in Mexico.”315 The lack of precise definitions of 
terms and the absence of means of measuring outcomes serves to 
conceal in technocratic-management language the central premise: the 
United States’ determination to remake Mexico’s judicial system to 
resemble “our (often fantastical) ideas of our own society.”316 
 
 310 USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORK: A GUIDE FOR USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OFFICERS 5–15 (2010), 
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt593.pdf (generic framework for USAID rule of 
law strategies); Upham, supra note 94, at 1 (criticizing rule of law projects that establish “a set 
of uniformly enforced, established legal regimes that clearly lays out the rules of the game”); see 
Gordon, supra note 95, at 466 (noting that law is a form of political and cultural expression). 
 311 About Us, MGMT. SYSTEMS INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/about-us (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014) (describing projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo). In particular, MSI boasts of rule of law projects in Eastern Europe, the 
former Soviet Union, Latin America, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. Practice 
Areas, MGMT. SYSTEMS INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/our-work/practice-areas (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (click on “Rule of Law”). 
 312 Access to Justice, CHECCHI & CO. CONSULTING, http://www.checchiconsulting.com/
index.php? option=com_projects&aoe_id=1&Itemid=8#66 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Mexico, 
CHECCHI & CO. CONSULTING, http://www.checchiconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_
projects&country_id=9&Itemid=8. (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); see Mackenzie, supra note 136. 
 313 See generally MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., supra note 74; see also PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 1 
(noting lack of proper evaluations). 
 314 MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., supra note 74, at 8–12. 
 315 Id. at 17. 
 316 Rory Stewart, The Irresistible Illusion, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (2009) (critiquing U.S. 
efforts to create a world view); see also Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of 
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USAID’s efforts to evaluate its program have not been successful, 
even by the superficial standards to which it purports to abide. The 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) determined that USAID/Mexico 
failed to provide accurate numbers of individuals it claimed to train; 
performance indicators were found “[in]appropriate for measuring 
progress.”317 The OIG noted that USAID did not succeed in delivering 
the program specifications: “USAID/Mexico’s technical officers 
responsible for the rule of law projects have not effectively carried out all 
their responsibilities,” and failed to establish a system for evaluation.318 
The GAO similarly reported that USAID failed to develop adequate 
performance measures, and noted too that it has been difficult to track 
the use of funds.319 USAID was also found to have violated procurement 
regulations in its award of the contract to MSI.320 
These types of findings are not new. For the last two decades, 
USAID has failed to provide meaningful evaluations of its rule of law 
initiatives.321 Incomplete and incorrect program assessments as a 
chronic condition cannot but invite the inference of deliberate efforts to 
conceal failure, and thereby stifle public debate about the efficacy of the 
rule of law initiative.322 Indeed, such strategies rely on a preordained 
agenda that fails to produce a coherent set of laws or legal systems and 
“insist[s] on the fiction of apolitical” in the realm of the development of 
laws.323 
Legal professionals who engage in these projects perform as 
technicians and function within what C. Wright Mills called the 
“bureaucratic ethos.”324 They tend to lack connection with or 
 
Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 92, at 253, 282 (describing related phenomena as “justification 
for opportunistic behavior”). 
 317 OFFICE OF THE U.S. INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 1-523-11-001-P, AUDIT OF 
USAID/MEXICO’S RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM 2, 8, 23 (2012), available at 
http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/1-523-11-001-p.pdf [hereinafter OIG 
REPORT]. 
 318 Id. at 2, 11. 
 319 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 9–10; see also PÁSARA, supra note 
209, at 3–4 (describing the difficulty in tracking USAID funds). 
 320 OIG REPORT, supra note 317, at 2; see H.R. REP. NO. 112-223, at 29 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt223/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt223.pdf. 
 321 PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 19 (reviewing the U.S. GAO reports’ finding that USAID has 
consistently failed to evaluate its rule of law programs throughout Latin America). 
 322 Riddell, supra note 95. 
 323 Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 96 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see PÁSARA, supra note 209, 
at 10 (describing legal transplant efforts as “highly standardized”); Roesler, supra note 92, at 
212 (observing that “rule-of-law practitioners” equate the rule of law with institutional 
checklists).  
 324 Roberto González, Embedded, in BESTEMAN, supra note 135, at 97, 113; see Yves Dezalay 
& Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers and Social Capital: “Rule of Law” Versus Relational 
Capitalism, 6 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 109, 132 (1997) (describing the transformation of lawyers 
into technocrats as the equivalent of U.S lawyers). 
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responsibility for the social consequences of their efforts to remake the 
Mexican judicial system. Legal academics often suspend their critical 
analytical abilities. Instead, as Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have 
suggested, they “mobilize on behalf of specific objectives consistent with 
their accepted universals” and “rely less on their scientific tools and 
more on the authority of the professional expertise or discipline they 
represent.”325 They forge ahead with their projects, often oblivious to the 
consequences of their lack of knowledge and frequently ignorant of their 
contributions to the problems they presume to remedy.326 There is little 
evidence of thoughtful reflection within the State Department and 
USAID, or among U.S. lawyers who participate in this endeavor.327 
CONCLUSION 
As Thomas Carothers has observed, “hardly anyone these days will 
admit to being against the idea of law.”328 Without a coherent and 
credible system of justice, efforts to establish order, control crime, and 
protect human rights are compromised. The rule of law serves as a 
means to protect citizens against rights violations and promote orderly 
due process. The exchange of legal values among nations may be 
beneficial in their own right, but a U.S. rule of law agenda as a (coercive) 
foreign policy initiative offers few benefits. Offered in the guise of 
promoting democratic changes abroad, rule of law programs are often 
little more than a means of political intervention to advance U.S. 
interests.329 These initiatives have been designed to expand the 
extraterritorial reach of the United States in the internal affairs of other 
countries, promote a neoliberal agenda, and maintain U.S. hegemony in 
the hemisphere.330 
 
 325 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 310. Indeed, law professors may ignore questions and 
concerns about the hierarchical construction of law. Id. at 312. 
 326 DAVIDSON, supra note 305, at 2 (describing the rule of law doctors as promoting 
“bureaucratic incompetence and empire building, personal spite and egotistical blindness”); see 
Smith, supra note 170, at 387 (describing an exchange between a U.S. lawyer studying Mexican 
constitutional law in Mexico, who when criticizing the lack of implementation of individual 
protections as demonstrated by the use of torture was reminded that at least Mexicans did not 
“fry people in electric chairs” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 327 Smith, supra note 170, at 387. 
 328 See Carothers, supra note 140, at 99. 
 329 ARCENEAUX & PION-BERLIN, supra note 99, at 86–87 (reviewing the settled 
pronouncements by Latin American historians). 
 330 Santos, supra note 316, at 255–56; see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 393, 394 (2006) (noting the need for new legal frameworks to 
accommodate globalization, liberalization, and market relations); Kathryn Tarker, Too Close for 
Comfort: El Salvador Ratchets Up Its U.S. Ties, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (July 20, 2005, 
2:36 PM), http://www.coha.org/too-close-for-comfort-el-salvador-ratchets-up-its-us-ties 
(describing the statement of purpose for the development of the International Law 
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The Mérida Initiative rule of law program continues a long history 
of U.S. efforts to export law. As with other foreign aid programs that 
link the export of institution-building programs and “humanitarian 
interventions” with military initiatives, the Mérida Initiative blurs the 
distinction between compassion and combat.331 It subsidizes legal 
trainings simultaneously with funding of weapon systems and 
surveillance technology. Often well-meaning lawyers arrive to Mexico 
with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, CIA officials, and 
military personnel from the Pentagon’s Northern Command.332 On the 
one hand, the Mérida Initiative has legitimatized violence by financing 
the escalation of a militarized response to the war on drugs while, on the 
other, it purports to mitigate violence by heightened criminalization 
strategies—a conceptual contradiction rejected by most Mexican human 
rights advocates.333 
It is difficult, moreover, to justify exporting a system of law that 
shares many of the very flaws that the Mérida Initiative rule of law 
program claims it seeks to improve. The U.S. criminal justice system 
hardly constitutes an ideal model to export—a concern expressed by 
Mexicans.334 They have criticized the Mérida Initiative as a hypocritical 
endeavor imposed by a government whose police officials kill Mexican 
immigrants and enjoy total impunity (éstos gozan de total libertad).335 
The U.S. legal system suffers from corruption that can hardly be 
described as isolated or random.336 
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There is little evidence that the rule of law program has produced 
the desired outcomes and no basis upon which to assume that it will 
enhance Mexico’s judicial system.337 Nonetheless, Congressional 
support is mounting for continued funding of the Mérida Initiative with 
a focus on the expansion of the rule of law program.338 A report 
prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations claims that “greater 
trust” has developed between U.S. and Mexican officials, even while 
acknowledging that the effort thus far has been ineffective and that the 
day-to-day lives of Mexicans have suffered as a result of an increase in 
violence.339 The report urges U.S. officials to “impress[] upon [Mexicans 
officials] the high priority that the U.S. Government assigns to the 
reform efforts” and recommends even greater attention to enhancing 
the prosecutorial powers of the Mexican Attorney General’s office.340 
The report suggests that the U.S. government take on an active role in 
policing (“cooperative law enforcement relationship”) at both the state 
and local level that would go beyond training to include the 
establishment of task forces.341 
As Dani Rodrik has observed, “[c]ountries have the right to protect 
their own social arrangements, regulations, and institutions,” and 
further, that “[c]ountries do not have the right to impose their 
institutions on others.”342 Human rights activists in Mexico have 
pursued a different rule of law agenda. They have focused on social 
inequalities, poverty, and health care as opposed to the war on 
crime/drugs motif.343 Grassroots movements have articulated their 
demands: Stop the criminalization model and support locally controlled 
community safety programs.344 Most notably, Mexican citizens have 
stated their desire for autonomy in determining the means to end the 
drug violence and improve the social fabric of their country: 
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Change in the neoliberal economic model. Experience and history 
have convinced us that the market is not a panacea that can solve the 
problems of society and government. Society should play a 
fundamental role in resolving the economic problems the country 
endures. That is why we will fight for a human, just, sovereign, 
sustainable and peaceful economy. 
Change in the model of national security. In order to restore peace, it 
is imperative to withdraw the armed forces from their role as police; 
as well as to stop the criminalization, repression and harassment of 
social protest and the population in general. . . . At the same time, we 
support autonomous community safety programs and organization 
against mega-projects. . . . 
We embrace the voice of social organizations and movements, 
connecting ourselves in solidarity in the search of alliances that are 
based on respect for autonomy, the construction of a horizontal 
relationship, and we recognize ourselves with humility as one of 
many social actors expressing social discontent.345 
These demands do not resemble the elements of USAID’s rule of law 
program. 
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